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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALTA INDUSTRIES LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, dba 
STEELCO, and ALTA INDUSTRIES -
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation, 
in its capacity as general 
partner of Alta Industries Ltd., 
Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
vs 
LYNN P. HURST and WASATCH 
STEEL INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
Supreme Court No. 900612 
Priority No. 16 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF RgVlEW 
The issues presented by defendants and appellants for review 
are as follows: 
1. Whether a certain settlement agreement 
between plaintiffs and a third party, Volma Heaton, 
bars plaintiffs' claims against defendants. 
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2. Whether plaintiffs1 claims for conversion and 
fraud are barred in whole or in part by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
3. Whether the court's findings of fraud and 
conspiracy are supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
4. Whether the finding of conversion is sup-
ported by the evidence. 
5. Whether the damages awarded were excessive. 
With very limited exceptions, all of the issues presented by 
defendants-appellants on appeal are issues of fact and, accord-
ingly, the appropriate standard of review is the clearly erroneous 
rule. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Copper State 
Leasing Co. v. Black Appliance & Furniture, 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 
1988). To the limited extent that appellants1 issues entail 
legal issues, the standard of review is correctness. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1988). 
The issues presented by plaintiffs and appellees under their 
cross-appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the district court erroneously dismiss 
Count VI of the Amended Complaint by ruling that to 
state a claim under the Utah Racketeering Enterprises 
Act, the claimant must demonstrate three separate 
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episodes of unlawful activity that involve separate and 
distinct victims rather than merely showing three 
separate episodes of unlawful activity that may involve 
only one victim? 
2. Did the district court erroneously dismiss 
Count VII of the Amended Complaint under the receiving 
used or secondhand stolen property statute by ruling 
that even though Wasatch Steel Inc. is a party dealing 
in used personal property, nevertheless the statute 
does not cover a business such as Wasatch Steel Inc. 
and its activities. 
Both of these are exclusively issues of law, for which the 
standard of review is correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
THE DETERMINATIVE STATUTES RELEVANT 
TO THE CROSS-APPEAL ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
With respect to the Racketeering Enterprises Act claim, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2): 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity11 means 
engaging in conduct which constitutes the 
commission of at least three episodes of 
unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics. Taken together, the episodes shall 
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and 
be related either to each other or to the 
enterprise. * * * 
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With respect to the receiving stolen property statute, Utah 
Code Ann, §76-6-408(2)(d), which defines the class of persons 
liable under Section 76-6-412(2): 
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or 
operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or an agent, employee or represen-
tative of the pawnbroker or person who buys, 
receives or obtains property. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs sought recovery from defen-
dants upon multiple theories based upon (i) defendants1 knowing 
purchase at bargain prices of on the order of 100 loads of steel 
products stolen from plaintiffs and (ii) defendants' payment of 
bribes and kickbacks to plaintiffs1 employees to induce them to 
inflate the prices that plaintiffs paid to defendants for steel 
products purchased from defendants. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition. Plaintiffs initiated 
this action by filing their Complaint on April 11, 1989. The 
case was tried to the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, sitting 
without a jury, between September 25 and October 2, 1990. The 
district court found for plaintiffs and against defendants on 
plaintiffs1 theories of fraud, conspiracy, conversion, and 
punitive damages, but dismissed plaintiffs1 claims under the 
Racketeering Enterprises Act and the receiving stolen property 
statute. The Court entered and filed its Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on December 3, 1990. Defendants 
filed their Notice of Appeal on December 20, 1990. Plaintiffs 
filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal on December 24, 1990. 
Statement of Facts. Appellants object to appellees' failure 
to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's findings, 
failure to cite to the record, and inaccurate statements of what 
the record shows. Because appellees are dissatisfied with the 
statement of facts of appellants, appellees offer their own 
statement of facts. 
Plaintiff Alta Industries Ltd. is a Utah limited partnership 
that does business under the name of "Steelco." Throughout 
trial, plaintiff was identified as "Steelco" and the same refer-
ence will be used for the remainder of this brief. Steelco is in 
the business of selling and fabricating new steel products. 
[R450 at 117.] 
Wasatch Steel Inc. ("Wasatch Steel") is also in the steel 
business. It buys and sells both new and used steel products. 
[R450 at 35-36.] The capital stock of Wasatch. Steel is owned 70% 
by Bill Holtman, 15% by his son-in-law, Lynn P. Hurst ("Hurst"), 
and 15% by his daughter, Teresa Thompson. [Exhibit 51-P; R454 at 
31.] At all material times, Holtman, Hurst, and Thompson com-
prised all of the directors and officers of Wasatch Steel. Hurst 
was at all material times the Vice President and General Manager 
of Wasatch Steel. [R450 at 32-33.] For convenience, Wasatch 
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Steel and Hurst will sometimes be collectively referred to as 
"defendants." 
In this action, Steelco sought to recover from both Wasatch 
Steel and Hurst the damages that it suffered because of two 
discrete kinds of misconduct: First, Wasatch Steel over a period 
of years knowingly purchased at bargain prices on the order of a 
hundred loads of steel that had been stolen from Steelco by Volma 
Heaton, who was then an employee of Steelco. Second, on multiple 
occasions, Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid bribes and kickbacks to 
two employees of Steelco, Volma Heaton and Chris Williams, to 
induce them to cause Steelco to pay fraudulently inflated prices 
for steel that Wasatch Steel sold to Steelco. Volma Heaton was 
employed as processing supervisor until 1985 and thereafter as 
plant superintendent at Steelco and Chris Williams was employed 
in Steelco1s purchasing department. [R450 at 194-95; R451 at 
143-44.] Both were fired when the first hint of their improper 
activity became known to Steelco. [R450 at 137; R452 at 122-24.] 
What follows is a substantially chronological description of the 
events that give rise to this action. 
Between 1983 and 1987, Volma Heaton stole a huge amount of 
steel product from Steelco and resold that product to Wasatch 
Steel at bargain prices. [R450 at 204-05.] At trial, three 
kinds of steel were discussed -- (i) new steel, (ii) remnant, and 
(iii) scrap. Wasatch Steel's brief uses the inaccurate term 
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"cuttings'1 misleadingly to suggest that the remnant steel stolen 
by Heaton and sold to Wasatch Steel was basically junk of insig-
nificant value. The term "cuttings" was used in passing at trial 
only once or twice -- the term "remnant" was almost universally 
used by both Heaton and Hurst to describe the kind of steel that 
was stolen and sold to Wasatch Steel. [E.g., R450 at 39-40, 
65-66; R454 at 134-35 (Hurst); R450 at 203; R451 at 74, 118 
(Heaton).] "New steel" is brand new steel, fresh from the mill, 
in stock sizes generated by the mill. Remnant steel, on the 
other hand, is created when a piece of new steel in a stock size 
is cut for any purpose leaving as a "remnant" a piece of steel 
that is still new and still large enough to be useful in 
Steelcofs operation of fabricating steel for its customers. 
[R336 17; R450 at 117-20; R451 at 117-20.] "Scrap," on the other 
hand, is basically junk steel that is not reuseable but has value 
only for remelting. Scrap steel may be either pieces of new 
steel that are too tiny to be reasonably used for other purposes 
or fabricated, bent up, or rusted out steel that is not salable 
as new steel because of its fabricated or rusted, used charac-
teristics. [R336 17.] 
Steelco does not just sell new steel in stock sizes. 
Steelco also cuts new steel into sizes and shapes and fabricates 
by bending or the like steel into shapes, all as requested by its 
customers. In this process, Steelco generates two by-products --
-7-
remnant and scrap. Steelco treated remnant steel and scrap steel 
very differently. Volma Heaton and Steelcofs other employees 
were directed to reuse the remnant steel generated in Steelcofs 
operation to the maximum extent. [R450 at 121-23.] The remnant 
material was placed in special racks within Steelco?s fabricating 
area for reuse; scrap, on the other hand, was deposited in nscrap 
tubs" for future sale to a scrap dealer. [R450 at 118.] The 
remnant material was worth as much to Steelco as new steel -- the 
pieces were just smaller. [R452 at 169-70.] If Steelco was 
requested to sell to a customer half a sheet of steel or half a 
steel beam or the like, and a remnant of that size existed, 
Steelco sold the remnant for the same price it would have charged 
for new steel. 
According to both Volma Heaton and Hurst, the material that 
Heaton sold to Wasatch Steel was almost exclusively remnant, not 
scrap. [R450 at 39-41; R450 at 202-03; R451 at 74-75, 117.] 
Heaton specifically testified that all of the stolen steel for 
which recovery is sought in this case was remnant steel. [R450 
at 202-03.] Heaton sold scrap to Wasatch Metal, not Wasatch 
Steel. [R451 at 117.] Wasatch Metal was a company dealing in 
scrap steel which was located near Wasatch Steel and was owned by 
Jack Holtman, who is the brother of Bill Holtman (the 70% owner 
of Wasatch Steel). [R450 at 60.] 
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All of the steel that was delivered by Volma Heaton to 
Wasatch Steel for which Steelco was awarded damages was owned by 
Steelco and stolen from Steelco -- Volma Heaton himself admitted 
that he stole the steel. [R450 at 202-05.] Heaton stole the 
steel after hours and went to great lengths to conceal his thefts 
from his employer, Steelco. Heaton knew that: Steelco required 
that the usual paperwork be prepared for employees1 purchases of 
steel for their own use, but he did not prepare such paperwork 
for the stolen steel. [R450 at 195-96.] Instead, if other 
Steelco employees became aware that he was removing steel from 
Steelcofs premises, Heaton created phony paperwork which was 
aimed at leading other Steelco employees to believe that he was 
purchasing the steel and thereafter the paperwork was destroyed. 
[R450 at 203-04.] 
As the Court found, Hurst and Wasatch Steel knew that the 
steel that Heaton was delivering had been stolen from Steelco. 
[R338 113.] Hurstfs and Heaton's dealings continued on a fre-
quent basis for in excess of four years. [R450 at 68-70.] Volma 
Heaton told Hurst on multiple occasions -- 20 to 25 -- that 
Heatonfs deliveries to Wasatch Steel were to be kept secret. 
[R451 at 7-8.] In response, Hurst agreed not to tell anyone at 
Steelco about Heatonfs deliveries. [R451 at 8.] By Hurst's own 
admission, even though he knew that all of the steel was coming 
from Steelco and even though he dealt with Heaton consistently 
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and frequently over a four-plus year period, Hurst never happened 
to mention to anyone at Steelco that Heaton was selling steel to 
him or was being paid for the steel, Hurst always asked to deal 
with Heaton at Steelco, Hurst dealt only with Heaton at Steelco, 
and Hurst never paid Heaton on Steelcofs premises. [R450 at 
68-70; R454 at 143-44.] All of Hurst's thirty-odd meetings with 
Heaton at Steelco!s premises were clandestine -- Hurst never 
announced his company name to Steelcofs receptionist, which is 
unusual, and he and Volma Heaton always met behind closed doors, 
which never happened with anyone other than Hurst. [R450 at 
68-70; R452 at 25-26, 79-80.] Steelco's employees were left with 
the impression that Hurst was only a social acquaintance of 
Heaton1s. [R452 at 26.] 
The delivery process was also suspicious. Heatonfs deliv-
eries were generally after Steelcofs business hours. [R451 at 1, 
103-04.] Hurst sometimes went to Steelcofs premises and picked 
out what he wanted, which was thereafter delivered to Wasatch 
Steel, but Hurst inexplicably paid Heaton for the steel. [R450 
at 66-67.] Hurst with Heaton actually entered Steelco's shop and 
picked out for his purchase remnant, which he (as a person in the 
steel business) knew or should have known was used and needed by 
Steelco. [R450 at 66-67.] Any rational person would think it 
strange to enter another steel company's shop, designate for 
purchase remnant material from remnant racks, which are obviously 
-10-
used by that business, and then pay the company's employee for 
that steel at a fraction of its true value. Wasatch Steel 
purchased the remnant for a fraction of its value to Steelco, 
which Hurst also knew or should have known. [R450 at 52-53.] 
Wasatch Steel paid both Steelco and Heaton for exactly the same 
kinds of materials in the amounts directed by Heaton, even though 
all of the steel came from Steelco. [R450 at 56-57, 66-67.] 
Many of the deliveries of steel for which Heaton was paid were by 
Steelcofs trucks, identified as such, yet Wasatch Steel paid 
Heaton for the steel. [R451 at 1, 114; R450 at 58-65.] There is 
no plausible reason why Steelco would furnish its own trucks to 
deliver its own steel to Wasatch Steel so that Heaton could be 
paid for the steel. When Steelcofs employees and trucks were 
used to deliver steel to Wasatch Steel, Hurst: and Heaton arranged 
to split Wasatch Steel's payment between Heaton and Steelco. 
[R451 at 4-5.] That, of course, left Steelco with the impression 
that it was being paid for all of the steel that its trucks and 
employees removed from Steelco's premises. Even though, on 
multiple occasions, the weight tickets delivered to Hurst showed 
the customer to be "Steelco," Hurst nevertheless paid Heaton for 
the steel. [R450 at 58-63.] Hurst told Heaton "I don't care who 
I pay." [R451 at 114-15.] 
Wasatch Steel suggests in its brief that it was justified in 
assuming that Heaton had the right to sell the steel since Heaton 
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was a supervisor. Wasatch Steel and Hurst could not have assumed 
Heatonfs bona fides, since they were concurrently paying him 
kickbacks and bribes to defraud his employer --a practice that 
Hurst, himself, called "sleazy.11 [R450 at 80-81.] 
Over a four-plus year period, Heaton delivered to Wasatch 
Steel on the order of 100 loads of steel, for which Wasatch Steel 
paid Heaton the bargain price of $38,136.43. [Exhibit 27-P; R452 
at 150-52.] The value of those same materials to both Steelco 
and to Wasatch Steel was approximately double that amount. [R450 
at 52-53; R452 at 169-70.] 
Wasatch Steel in its brief suggests that Steelco was awarded 
damages against Wasatch Steel and Hurst for steel delivered to 
them which either (i) was given to Heaton by Steelco or (ii) for 
which Heaton paid Steelco. No evidence supports either as-
sertion, and each will be addressed in turn. 
The district court found that on one specific occasion, 
Steelco did agree with Heaton that Heaton could have certain 
specific scrap fabricated beams and old scrap fabricated steel 
equipment if Heaton would on his own time cut up and remove those 
specific materials from Steelco!s premises. That arrangement 
related only to specifically identified fabricated steel of a 
quantity that did not exceed 40,000 pounds. [Finding of Fact 
110; R338.] The trial court found that with the exclusive 
exception of a maximum of 40,000 pounds of scrap that was so 
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given to Heaton, all of the steel delivered to Wasatch Steel was 
stolen. [Id.] The trial court did not award any damages to 
Steelco for that 40,000 pound quantity of scrap that was given to 
Heaton -- the value of that 40,000 pound quantity was deducted 
from the amounts for which Wasatch Steel was found liable. 
[Finding of Fact K58, R356.] Steelcofs General Manager, Leon 
Hansen, testified that the maximum amount of fabricated steel and 
old equipment that was given to Heaton was 40,000 pounds and that 
it was all scrap. [R450 at 132-36.] Heaton testified that the 
only material given to him was scrap, which he sold to Wasatch 
Metals. [R451 at 12-14.] Hurst testified that he did not intend 
to purchase scrap from Steelco -- only remnant. [R450 at 40-41.] 
With respect to the steel for which Heaton paid, the evi-
dence is also clear and uncontradicted. Heaton himself testified 
that he paid a total of only $200 to $300 to Steelco for his 
personal purchases of material. [R450 at 202; R451 at 90.] Bob 
Elkington, Steelcofs Chief Executive Officer, searched all of 
Steelcofs records for invoices evidencing Volma Heaton's pur-
chases throughout his employment and located only invoices 
totaling approximately $400. [Exhibit 16-P; R452 at 136-37.] 
All invoices showed that payment was effected with cash. [Exhibit 
16-P.] The documents are therefore fully consistent with Heatonfs 
testimony as to the approximate magnitude of his cash payments. 
There was no evidence that any additional amounts were paid to 
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Heaton for material purchases. The trial court found that all of 
the materials for which damages were awarded were stolen by 
Heaton and not paid for. [Finding of Fact til; R338.] 
Hurst and Wasatch Steel, in addition to knowingly receiving 
vast amounts of stolen steel, bribed Steelco's employees to cause 
Steelco to pay fraudulently inflated amounts for steel purchased 
from Wasatch Steel. Hurst admitted paying kickbacks to Volma 
Heaton but denied paying any kickbacks to Chris Williams. 
Accordingly, the Heaton and Williams kickback situations will be 
addressed separately. 
Hurst admitted paying at least four kickbacks to Heaton. 
[R450 at 90-92.] Hurst was impeached with his deposition at 
trial. In his deposition, Hurst admitted that, at the time he 
paid the kickbacks, he thought it was a "sleazy" practice, that 
it caused his view of Heaton's integrity and honesty to drop, and 
that Hurst would have immediately fired one of his own employees 
if that employee accepted kickbacks under the very same circum-
stances -- Hurst explained that an employee's receipt of kick-
backs was obviously not in the employer's best interest. [R450 
at 79-81, 89.] In his trial testimony, Hurst changed his mind 
and remarkably testified that, so long as the price of the 
material was competitive, he would not care whether his employees 
received secret kickbacks; indeed, he said he would be impressed 
with their initiative! Mr. Hurst's extraordinarily conflicting 
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and unbelievable trial and deposition testimony on this subject 
is found at R450 at 78-89, Hurst also said, on the one hand, 
that the greater his profit margin, the greater the kickback he 
would pay, but on the other hand, the fact that he paid the 
kickback would not necessarily increase Steelco's cost of mate-
rial. [R454 at 147, 150-51.] When asked if Hurst would have 
sold Steelco the same material at his price less the kickback 
amount (which would yield Wasatch Steel the exact same amount), 
Hurst was not sure. [Id.] 
Hurst initially testified that Heaton was being paid only to 
arrange the purchases and was not being paid to cause his employer 
to pay an inflated price. [R450 at 71-72.] When he paid the 
kickbacks, Hurst knew that Heaton was a participant in the 
negotiations on behalf of Steelco to purchase the steel. [R450 
at 75.] After first flatly denying it, Hurst finally admitted 
that Heaton had told him "I need some commission [a kickback] to 
get them [Steelco] to use this rough of material." [R454 at 
152-54.] As will be seen, the material Hurst sold Steelco was 
very rough --it was in large part unusable junk. 
The kickbacks were as much as 25% of Wasatch Steel's mar-
gin -- a big chunk. [Exhibit 28-P.] One kickback transaction 
will illustrate what is going on here. Wasatch Steel purchased 
one load of junk steel at 8c per pound and immediately resold it 
to Steelco for 13%C per pound -- Hurst received almost $2,000 for 
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in effect making the kickback telephone call. Somebody else even 
did the delivering for Hurst. In return, Hurst paid Heaton l%c 
per pound ($497.70) -- about 25% of Hurst's margin for causing 
his employer to buy the junk. [Exhibit 57-D; Exhibit 13-P, Tab 
3.] 
The materials that were sold under the kickback arrangements 
were obviously bad. To serve its purpose, the steel material on 
which kickbacks were paid had to be unlaminated, relatively 
smooth, and free of holes. [R452 at 80, 85; R450 at 145.] The 
materials that Hurst delivered were laminated, rough, of irregular 
shapes, and had holes in them. They were, in fact, junk. 
[Exhibits 35-P through 44-P; R452 at 80-94.] 
Volma Heaton testified that Hurst paid him at least four 
kickbacks in addition to four admitted by Hurst, for a total of 
at least eight kickbacks. [Exhibit 13-P; R451 at 26-30.] 
Although Hurst at trial admitted paying Heaton only four kick-
backs, he also testified that he did not know whether the remain-
ing four identified by Heaton were, or were not, kickbacks. 
[R450 at 94-100.] The additional four kickbacks, however, were 
paid close in time to Steelco's purchase of the goods in ques-
tion, all bear a precise mathematical relationship to the number 
of pounds sold to Steelco, and all were identified by Heaton as 
kickbacks. [Exhibit 13-P; R451 at 26-30.] 
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With respect to each kickback transaction, Heaton would call 
Hurst on the telephone and indicate that he could cause Steelco 
to purchase certain material. Hurst would quote a price after 
which Heaton and Hurst would agree to jack up that price and to 
pay a portion of the increase back to Heaton as a kickback. 
Heaton always told Hurst that Steelco was not: to know about their 
arrangements and Hurst agreed to keep their arrangements secret. 
[R451 at 23-24, 31-32.] After their arrangements were complete, 
Heaton would arrange for Steelco*s purchasing department to issue 
a purchase order for the materials in question at the fraudulently 
inflated price or, on occasion, Heaton would issue a purchase 
order himself for the inflated price. [R451 at 23-24.] Steelcofs 
purchasing department was never informed of the kickback arrange-
ments. [R451 at 31; R452 at 54.] 
Chris Williams first became involved with Wasatch Steel by 
assisting Heaton with his deliveries to Wasatch Steel on 8-12 
occasions. Heaton and Williams became friends, and Heaton told 
Williams about his kickback arrangement with Wasatch Steel. 
[R451 at 148-52.] The trial court found that Wasatch Steel and 
Hurst paid to Chris Williams kickbacks in a minimum aggregate 
amount of $5,700 during 1986. [Finding of Fact 132; R345.] 
Chris Williams, like Volma Heaton, testified that she negotiated 
with Hurst on Steelcofs steel purchases from Wasatch Steel, that 
Hurst would initially quote a price, and that the price to be 
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paid by Steelco was thereafter jacked up in connection with a 
conversation in which Hurst agreed to pay a kickback to Chris 
Williams. [R451 at 152-53.] Unlike Heaton, who was paid his 
kickbacks by check, Williams was paid in cash. Williams and 
Hurst split the total amount of the price increase, with Williams 
receiving about 80% and Hurst receiving about 20%. [R451 at 
187-90.] It is not surprising that the procedure was similar for 
both Heaton and Williams, since Heaton initially told Williams 
about his obtaining kickbacks from Hurst. [R451 at 151-52.] 
Hurst, on the other hand, testified that he had never met or 
seen Chris Williams prior to the initiation of this action. 
[R450 at 108.] Both Chris Williams and Volma Heaton testified 
that Chris Williams accompanied Heaton on many of his delivery 
trips to Wasatch Steel and that Heaton formally introduced Chris 
Williams to Hurst on at least one occasion. [R451 at 6, 148-50.] 
Volma Heaton testified that Hurst joked to Heaton about an old 
man like Heaton being with a pretty young woman like Chris 
Williams. [R451 at 6.] Patty Midgley, another Steelco employee, 
confirmed that Chris Williams knew Hurst during 1986 and that in 
fact Hurst once greeted Chris Williams in the presence of Patty 
Midgley at a movie theater. [R452 at 28-30.] 
In their statement of facts, defendants attempt to develop 
minute and irrelevant mathematical disparities in the kickback 
transactions. These minor "disparities11 exist, however, only if 
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Chris Williams was paid the exact amounts on the three exact 
transactions identified by defendants, and no others. Chris 
Williams never testified that she was sure of the exact trans-
actions on which she was paid kickbacks, that she was sure of the 
precise amounts involved on any transaction, that she was sure of 
the period of time during which she received the kickbacks, or 
that she was sure of the number of kickbacks she was paid. She 
said she could not be sure of the details because the trans-
actions occurred over four years ago. What she did say was that 
she was sure she received a total of approximately $6,000 in 
kickbacks, that she thought she received them in at least three 
transactions, and that with respect to each, Hurst quoted a 
selling price which was jacked up by an agreed amount which was 
thereafter split between Chris Williams and Hurst. [R451 at 
152-53, 169, 186, 204-05.] 
At trial, Wasatch Steel claimed that it never had enough 
cash to pay Chris Williams what she claimed to have been paid. 
Even defendants1 own self-serving summary shows that Wasatch 
Steel deposited over $18,000 per month in cash. [Exhibit 53-D.] 
Hurst admitted that Wasatch Steel takes in about $120,000 per 
month in revenue, but that he could not even estimate the per-
centage of that amount that was cash. [Exhibit 50-P; R454 at 
16-20.] Whether businesses that knowingly receive stolen prop-
erty and pay bribes report all cash receipts is open to fair 
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question. Chris Williams received a total of only $6,000. As 
Hurst testified, only he and his father-in-law, Bill Holtman, 
handled cash. [R450 at 34.] 
Hurst's production at trial of information concerning cash 
receipts is itself most interesting. When asked about these very 
same cash receipt records in his deposition, Hurst testified that 
all of his flrecords detailing cash transactions" were stolen at 
the end of 1987, coincidentally within a very short time after 
Hurst learned that Steelco was investigating Heaton's dealings 
with Wasatch Steel. [R454 at 120-26.] Notwithstanding this 
theft of "everything," and that as a result, he didn't "have any 
records detailing cash transactions," Hurst was inexplicably able 
to locate the same cash records that he claimed had been stolen 
to prepare Exhibit 53-D and offer it into evidence as the only 
evidence of his cash receipts. [R454 at 119-21.] When Hurst was 
deposed prior to trial, however, he very clearly stated under 
oath that all of Wasatch Steel's cash records were unavailable 
because they had been stolen. [R454 at 122-23.] Hurst stated in 
his deposition, "I don't have any records detailing cash trans-
actions" for 1986. [R454 at 123.] At trial, Hurst testified 
that he researched his records and came up with a summary of cash 
deposits for May, June, and July, 1986. [R454 at 120.] Linda 
Bryant, who Hurst testified was his bookkeeper, and from whom the 
records were allegedly stolen, was not called by Wasatch Steel as 
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a witness at trial to confirm the alleged theft. It is not sur-
prising that the trial court chose not to believe Mr. Hurst in 
all respects. 
During mid-1986, Steelco discovered approximately $1,000 in 
cash missing and conducted an investigation into the identity of 
the thief. Steelco ultimately satisfied itself that Chris 
Williams was the party that had stolen the cash and fired her in 
June of 1986. The cash thefts had nothing to do with Wasatch 
Steel. At the time that Steelco fired Chris Williams, Steelco 
had no knowledge of Volma Heaton?s thefts or Wasatch Steel's 
kickbacks to Heaton and Williams. [R452 at 122-23; R451 at 
155-56.] 
During December of 1987, Steelco for the first time learned 
that Volma Heaton was stealing its steel products. [R452 at 
125-27.] Bob Elkington, Steelco's chief executive, interviewed 
Volma Heaton and learned that some of the material had been sold 
to Wasatch Steel. [R452 at 128-29.] When Elkington contacted 
Hurst to pursue the investigation further, Hurst refused to tell 
him anything before he talked to his attorney. [R452 at 130.] 
Even though Hurst knew that Steelco was Heaton!s employer and 
that Steelco was the party from which the steel came, he refused 
to talk to Elkington, who he knew to be a Steelco management 
person. Before showing Elkington anything, Hurst first spoke to 
Heaton. [R450 at 101.] After Heaton and Hurst talked, Heaton 
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gave Bob Elkington a letter in which Heaton indicated that he and 
Hurst had found that "he [Hurst] had paid me a total of $9,185.85" 
and that "if you like please call Lynn and he can confirm this 
amount." [Exhibit 20-P; R452 at 130.] The $9,185.85 figure was 
a false number that was a small fraction of the amounts that 
Wasatch Steel had in fact paid Heaton. Elkington then called 
Hurst, who confirmed the phony $9,185.85 number. [R452 at 
131-32.] Nevertheless, Elkington insisted on seeing Wasatch 
Steelfs records concerning the Heaton payments. [R452 at 132.] 
Hurst further delayed Elkingtonfs access to the records by 
demanding Heaton!s written permission for Elkington to see the 
records. [R452 at 132.] When Elkington finally met with Hurst 
on December 31, 1987, Hurst did not show him all of his records, 
but only the receipts that he, Hurst, had himself pulled from the 
records, year by year. [R452 at 133.] Elkington asked to see 
Wasatch Steel's records for years prior to 1985, but Hurst said 
the information was no longer available, which was false. [R452 
at 134; Exhibits 1-P and 2-P.] Although Hurst at trial admitted 
paying Heaton four kickbacks, he did not tell Elkington about any 
of these kickbacks in December of 1987, even though he knew 
Elkington was there to investigate the dishonest activities of 
Heaton with Wasatch Steel. [R450 at 106-07.] One of the re-
ceipts that Hurst showed Elkington did happen to identify a 
"commission" paid to Heaton in the amount of $85.44. [Exhibit 
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14-P; R450 at 104; Exhibit 4-P.] There was no indication that 
the "commission" related in any way to Steelcofs purchase of 
materials. Because of its insignificant amount and Elkingtonfs 
assumption that it related to something unrelated that Heaton had 
done for Wasatch Steel, Elkington thought nothing of it. [R453 
at 12.] Although Elkington asked Hurst whether any other Steelco 
employees were involved, Hurst did not identify Chris Williams, 
even though she participated in the deliveries and was paid 
kickbacks. [R452 at 135.] 
A few months later, Steelco and Heaton entered into a 
Settlement Agreement under which Heaton repaid to Steelco a 
portion of its losses and warranted that he had fully disclosed 
all of his unlawful activities to Steelco. [Exhibit 22-P; R452 
at 138.] That warranty was inaccurate in multiple respects. At 
the time the agreement was signed, Steelco had no knowledge of 
the kickbacks, of sales of stolen materials to others, or of 
Wasatch Steel's complicity in Heatonfs thefts. [R452 at 147.] 
About six months later, on October 7, 1988, Chris Williams, 
voluntarily and on her own initiative, contacted Elkington at 
Steelco. [R451 at 158; R452 at 141.] Chris Williams had been a 
drug addict who stole from Steelco during her employment to 
support her habit. After she was fired by Steelco for stealing 
$1,000 in June, 1986, Williams in October, 1987 checked herself 
into a drug treatment center and kicked her drug habit. [R451 at 
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155-57.] As a part of her recovery, Chris Williams became active 
in Alcoholics Anonymous. After consultation with her counselors, 
Chris Williams determined that it was important to make a full 
disclosure to Steelco of the extent of her thefts, which she had 
not done previously. [R451 at 158, 200-01.] Although she had 
been fired two years earlier and had since had no contact with 
Steelco, Chris Williams contacted Elkington and told him that she 
desired to make full disclosure concerning her unlawful activ-
ities. She explained to Elkington that the cash theft for which 
she was fired was only a small amount of her unlawful receipts 
and advised Steelco of her receipt of approximately $6,000 in 
kickbacks. She did not initially, however, advise Elkington of 
the identity of the party paying the kickbacks. [R451 at 158; 
R452 at 141-44.] In October, 1988, Chris Williams finally 
identified Wasatch Steel as the party paying the kickbacks. 
[R452 at 146.] Until Chris Williams made this disclosure, 
Steelco did not know that Wasatch Steel had paid kickbacks to 
Heaton or that Wasatch Steel was knowingly acting improperly in 
its dealings with Heaton. 
Because of the revelation of Chris Williams that Heaton had 
also been paid kickbacks and the discovery of other sales of 
stolen steel by Heaton to additional previously undisclosed 
parties, Steelco and Heaton rescinded the Settlement Agreement 
between them and agreed that the amounts Heaton had previously 
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paid to Steelco could be allocated to whatever losses that 
Steelco had suffered as a result of Heaton's improper activities. 
[R452 at 147-48; R451 at 45.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Heaton-Steelco Settlement Agreement Has no Effect 
Upon Steelcofs Claims Against Defendants. This issue was not 
properly raised below. The Settlement Agreement does not affect 
Steelcofs claims against defendants and has, in any event, been 
rescinded. 
2. Limitations Poses no Bar. Limitations poses no bar 
because defendants raised the limitations period below only 
concerning the conversion claim, this action was filed within the 
limitations period after plaintiffs1 discovery of its claims, and 
defendants fraudulently concealed the facts from plaintiffs. 
3. The Court's Findings are Supported. The trial court's 
findings of fraud, conspiracy, and conversion are supported by 
the evidence. 
4. The Measure and Calculation of Damages was Appropriate. 
The trial court used the correct measure of damages, attorney's 
fees are mandated here, and punitive damages in the amount 
awarded are appropriate. 
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5. Steelco is Entitled to Recover Under the Racketeering 
Enterprises Act. The court's findings establish each element 
necessary to establish a claim under this law. 
6. Steelco is Entitled to Recover Under the Receiving 
Stolen Property Act. The trial courtfs findings establish each 
element required to recover under this law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HEATON-STEELCO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
HAS NO EFFECT UPON STEELCO15 CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
Shortly following Steelcofs discovery of Volma Heatonfs 
thefts, Steelco and Volma Heaton entered into a certain Settle-
ment Agreement. [Exhibit 22-P.] That agreement provided: 
9. Agreement Not to Sue. If, but only 
if, (a) Heaton timely pays and performs each 
and every obligation under this Agreement and 
under each instrument, document and agreement 
delivered by Heaton to the Company [Steelco] 
pursuant to this Agreement; and (b) all of 
the representations and warranties of Heaton 
set forth in this Agreement or otherwise made 
to the Company are and remain true, accurate 
and complete, the Company shall not initiate 
or join in a lawsuit or any other action 
against Heaton in connection with the wrong-
ful and unlawful transactions and circum-
stances covered by this Agreement. 
Wasatch Steel and Hurst argue that this provision amounts to a 
release without reservation of a joint tortfeasor which under 
Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 operates to release all other joint 
tortfeasors -- Hurst and Wasatch Steel. Wasatch Steel is wrong 
upon a host of grounds. 
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A
- The Utah Joint Obligations Act Defense was not Properly 
Presented Below. Defendants argue that the Utah Joint Obliga-
tions Act, Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4, bars Steelco's recovery in 
this case. Defendants1 Amended Answer, in Second Affirmative 
Defense, referred to the Settlement Agreement and alleged only 
that f,[t]he Agreement contains no reservation of rights and 
therefore constitutes a complete bar to Plaintiff's action.ff 
[R88.] The Amended Answer did not refer to Section 15-4-4 and 
did not suggest that the defense was in any way premised upon the 
release of a joint obligor. Defendants1 final argument is 
contained in its Memorandum and Argument, which makes absolutely 
no reference to any such defense. [R387.] 
This Court normally will only consider questions which were 
properly raised below. E.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 7 (Utah 1991); Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 
746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). Even assuming that the Amended 
Answer properly raised this theory, defendants' failure to argue 
the theory to the trial court precludes their raising it for the 
first time on appeal. In Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982), plaintiff successfully 
sued for breach of a covenant not to compete. On appeal, the 
defendants contended that the covenant not to compete was con-
trary to public policy. The Supreme Court unanimously held: 
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The defendants1 contention that the covenant 
not to compete was contrary to public policy 
was raised as a defense in their answer, but 
no argument was made to the district court on 
this issue and no evidence was presented. 
This Court will not consider on appeal issues 
which were not submitted to the trial court 
and concerning which the trial court did not 
have the opportunity to make any findings of 
fact or law. JEd. at 672. 
Defendants cannot be said to have given the district court an 
opportunity to rule upon their unarticulated, unargued theory. 
Under this Court's established rule, this theory of defense 
should not be considered now. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 (1986) has Been Repealed Pro 
Tanto. Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 provides in substance "that a 
release of one joint obligor releases all other obligors unless 
the injured party expressly reserves in writing its rights 
against the other obligors." Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349, 1350 (Utah 1986). There is a clear conflict between that 
statute and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-42 (1986), which was enacted 
much later in time. The latter provides: 
A release given by a person seeking recovery 
to one or more defendants does not discharge 
any other defendant unless the release so 
provides. 
In Krukiewicz, the Supreme Court held that Section 78-27-42 is a 
pro tanto repeal of Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4: 
Section 78-27-42 is ffby necessary 
implication" a pro tanto repeal of §15-4-4 of 
the Joint Obligations Act, U.C.A., 1953, 
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§15-4-1, to -7, which states that a release 
of one joint obligor releases all other 
obligors unless the injured party expressly 
reserves in writing its rights against the 
other obligors. Id. at 1350. 
After explaining that Section 78-27-42 is derived from the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975), 
the Court noted that n[a] primary purpose of the Uniform Act was 
to change the common law rule so that release of one joint 
tort-feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." Id 
at 1351. Thus, the rule is settled in Utah that the Legisla-
ture's enactment of Section 78-27-42 repealed, pro tanto, Section 
15-4-4, upon which Wasatch Steel exclusively relies. 
The cases advanced by defendants in support of their argu-
ment that the release of one joint obligor without express 
reservation of rights against other joint obligors releases the 
others are all inapposite. Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, 
Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972) was overruled by Krukiewicz. 
Defendants incorrectly state that Krukiewicz overruled Holmstead 
"on other grounds.11 The Krukiewicz Court stated that ff[t]he sole 
issue on appeal is whether §78-27-42 of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act overrules Holmstead." Id. at 1350. The Krukiewicz 
Court unanimously held that Section 15-4-4 was pro tanto repealed 
and that Holmstead was thus overruled. The issue involved in 
Krukiewicz, Holmstead, and this case is identical. The other 
cases advanced by defendants in support of their argument that 
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the release of one joint tortfeasor releases them all predate 
Krukiewicz and come from other jurisdictions. Many deal with the 
separate issue of whether plaintiff can make a double recovery, 
and none are directly on point. The only two Utah cases in 
addition to Holmstead cited by defendants apply Utah Code Ann. 
§15-4-2, not 15-4-4, and stand for the proposition that the 
plaintiff cannot make a double recovery, not for the proposition 
that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all joint 
tortfeasors. See Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 769 
P.2d 809 (Utah 1988) and Western Steel Co. v. Travel Batcher 
Corp., 663 P.2d 82 (Utah 1983). 
Krukiewicz also defeats defendantsf argument that the 
Comparative Negligence Act does not apply to intentional torts. 
The Krukiewicz Court stated: 
Section 78-27-40(3), patterned after the 1939 
Uniform Act, defines a joint tort-feasor in 
terms of liability, not negligence: Joint 
tort-feasor means Mone of two or more per-
sons, jointly or severally liable in 
tort. . . ." Id. at 1351. 
Thus, despite its name, the Utah Comparative Negligence Act 
applies no matter what theory of liability is advanced by the 
plaintiff. Krukiewicz at 1352. 
Section 15-4-4 is a codification of an old common law rule 
that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all others 
unless the injured party reserves its rights against the other 
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joint tortfeasors. Krukiewicz at 1350. The harsh, illogical old 
common law rule has, however, fallen into disfavor. Recognizing 
that a party should be deemed to release "only those other 
parties whom he intends to release," the United States Supreme 
Court has repudiated the common law rule. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971). The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts has also abandoned the old common law 
rule: 
A valid release of one tortfeasor from 
liability for a harm, given by the injured 
person, does not discharge others liable for 
the same harm, unless it is agreed that it 
will discharge them. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, §885(1) (1977). 
Since the rule that is codified in Section 15-4-4 has been 
generally abandoned, it would make no sense for this Court to 
reexamine its determination that Section 15-4-4 is no longer 
effective. 
C. The Covenant Not to Sue Never Became Effective. As 
quoted above, Steelco's covenant not to sue Heaton became effec-
tive "if, but only if, . . . all of the representations and 
warranties of Heaton set forth in this Agreement or otherwise 
made to [Steelco] are and remain true, accurate and complete." 
[Exhibit 22-P 19.] As the trial court found, Heaton's warranty 
in paragraph 1 that he had fully disclosed all of his wrongful 
and unlawful activities was false when made. [Findings of Fact 
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KK54, 55; R355.] The court's finding is abundantly supported by 
the evidence that, among other things, Heaton substantially 
understated his deliveries to Wasatch Steel and All Star 
Manufacturing, Heaton was paid undisclosed kickbacks, and Heaton 
sold substantial stolen steel to previously undisclosed parties, 
including Davis Supply and Mr. Trailer. These breaches are fully 
detailed and supported at pages 35-38 of this brief. 
Since Heaton's warranties in the Settlement Agreement were 
false, by the very terms of paragraph 9, the covenant not to sue 
never became operative, and no "release" of any joint tortfeasor 
occurred. 
D. A Covenant Not to Sue Does Not Constitute a Release. 
Even if Section 15-4-4 is resurrected, and even if the covenant 
not to sue somehow became operative notwithstanding Heatonfs 
false warranties, nevertheless the covenant did not constitute a 
"release." Many jurisdictions have adopted a covenant not to sue 
as a device for evading the now-discredited common law rule that 
a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. Annotation, 
Release of One Joint Tortfeasor as Discharging Liability of 
Others: Modem Trends, 73 A.L.R. 2d 403, 418 (1960). The 
Restatement adopts this view as well: "A covenant not to sue one 
tortfeasor or not to proceed further against him does not dis-
charge any other tortfeasor liable for the same harm." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §885(2) (1977). 
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The Court in Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. 
Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1959), applying Utah law, held: 
Satisfaction of judgment against one of two 
or more joint and several obligors will bar 
an action against the remaining obligors. On 
the other hand, a mere covenant not to sue 
one joint and several obligor does not 
release the remaining obligors. Ld. at 160. 
Similarly, in United States v. First Security Bank, 208 F.2d 424 
(10th Cir. 1953), the Court implied that a covenant not to sue is 
not "an outright release from liability11 and "does not bar an 
action against other joint tortfeasors." I^d. at 428. Two Utah 
Supreme Court opinions also implicitly recognize that a covenant 
not to sue does not release other joint tortfeasors when the 
plaintiff has not gained full satisfaction of his claims. In 
Green v. Lang Co., 206 P.2d 626 (Utah 1949), the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed a plaintiff to pursue a second joint obligor after 
the plaintiff had executed a covenant not to sue the first. In 
Dawson v. Board of Education, 222 P.2d 590 (Utah 1950), the Court 
elaborated on the characteristics of a covenant not to sue which 
distinguish it from a complete release: f,In a true covenant not 
to sue, the amount of damages is uncertain, the party does not 
intend to fix the loss by the agreement, and full satisfaction is 
not admitted." Id. at 593 (emphasis added). The covenant not to 
sue Heaton, even if effective, does not operate to bar claims 
against joint tortfeasors under Section 15-4-4. 
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E. The Settlement Agreement was Rescinded. The trial 
court found that Steelco and Heaton agreed to rescind the 
Settlement Agreement and that Steelco was entitled to do so even 
absent the agreement of Heaton because of Heatonfs misrepresen-
tations and omissions. [Finding of Fact 155; R355.] The 
rescission agreement is marked as Exhibit 24-P. By the terms of 
paragraph 1 of that agreement, the Settlement Agreement was re-
scinded in its entirety. Wasatch Steel implausibly argues that 
all of the parties to the Settlement Agreement could not rescind 
it, but offers no authority for this obviously incorrect proposi-
tion. It is true that the rescission agreement was executed 
after the filing of this lawsuit, but it is also true that the 
issue of the rescission was tried with the consent of both 
parties and the court made specific findings upon that issue. 
Wasatch Steel next argues that no consideration supported 
Heaton!s agreement to rescind. First, the law does not require 
consideration to support a rescission, and Wasatch Steel offers 
no authority to the contrary. Second, by rescinding both 
parties1 obligations under the Settlement Agreement, Heaton was 
relieved of multiple obligations under the Settlement Agreement 
which provide ample consideration, even were it required. Heaton 
was relieved of his warranties under paragraph 1, Heaton was 
relieved of the confession of judgment appearing in paragraph 3, 
Heaton was relieved of his assignment of amounts due him under 
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paragraph 5, Heaton was relieved of his noncompetition agreement 
in paragraph 7, and Heaton was relieved of his indemnification 
obligations under paragraph 10. There was plenty of consid-
eration, if consideration is required. 
Defendants remarkably argue at pages 33-34 of their brief 
that Heaton!s warranties were not inaccurate or false. Defen-
dants1 statements are absolutely contrary to the court's findings 
and to the record. The trial court found that Heaton!s warranty 
that he had fully disclosed all of his wrongful and unlawful 
activities in steel sales to Steelco was false. [Finding of Fact 
154; R355.] 
In the Settlement Agreement, Heaton warranted "that the 
schedule attached to this Agreement as Exhibit A is true, accu-
rate and complete and sets forth the full and complete details of 
each and every transaction and circumstance in which Heaton was 
involved during his employment by the Company [Steelco] in which 
Heaton acted wrongfully or unlawfully. . . .ff Following are some 
of the respects in which Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement 
was inaccurate and incomplete: 
First, Exhibit A indicates that Heaton received only 
$10,718.70 through his sale of materials to All Star Manufactur-
ing. As the court found, Heaton sold more than double that 
amount to All Star Manufacturing -- a total of $24,789.55. 
[Finding of Fact 157; R356; Exhibit 29-P (which computes the 
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total value of the subject steel in relation to the amounts paid 
to Heaton).] Heaton testified that All Star or its owner, Jim 
Shaw, paid him in cash the total sum of $8,657.97. [R451 at 
34-35; Exhibit 19-P.] In addition to that cash, Heaton testified 
that Shaw and/or All Star traded him trailers and trailer parts 
valued at between $12,000 and $15,000 for additional steel he 
stole from Steelco. [R451 at 35-37,] This testimony was un-
disputed. 
Second, Exhibit A estimated Heaton1s sales to Wasatch Steel 
during 1983 and 1984 to be $5,000. As the evidence reflects, 
Heaton was paid almost double that amount during 1983 and 1984. 
[Exhibit 27-P.] Wasatch Steel asserts at page 33 of its brief 
that, with respect to sales during 1983 and 1984, Elkington was 
told that the 1983 and 1984 documents would be made available at 
a more convenient time and with Heatonfs authorization. No 
citation to the record is found because the record does not 
support that assertion. Elkington testified that he requested 
those records and Hurst told him that they were no longer avail-
able. [R452 at 134.] Hurst testified that he didn't show the 
1983 and 1984 records to Elkington because Heaton had not given 
his permission. [R450 at 104.] If that were true, why wouldn!t 
Elkington have sought Heatonfs permission, which was given when 
requested for 1985 records? [R452 at 134.] It makes no sense. 
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Third, Heaton did not disclose to Steelco that he had 
received kickbacks in an aggregate amount of over $4,000 from 
Wasatch Steel. [Exhibit 28-P.] Heaton disclosed none of those 
kickbacks in the Settlement Agreement. Wasatch Steel argues that 
because Hurst showed Bob Elkington a receipt showing a "commis-
sion'1 for less than $100 which had no indication that it was a 
kickback or even concerned Steelco, somehow Steelco was charged 
with knowledge of all of the kickbacks paid by Wasatch Steel, 
even though the evidence is undisputed that Steelco was not aware 
of them. Even with respect to the vague, minuscule "commission" 
payment of ninety-odd dollars that was shown to Elkington, 
Elkington testified that he assumed that Heaton had been paid for 
doing something else for Wasatch Steel and that he thought 
nothing of it. [R453 at 12.] Although Elkington did concede 
that it was possible that he talked to Hurst about this "commis-
sion," even though he did not recall it, he was sure that any 
such conversation did not lead him to believe that Wasatch Steel 
was paying Heaton for arranging Steelco1s purchases at inflated 
prices. [R453 at 12.] In Hurst's version of his conversation 
with Elkington, he never mentioned any discussion on the subject 
of commissions. [R450 at 102-07; R454 at 92-98.] Everyone 
agrees that Hurst did not disclose at least seven kickbacks to 
Elkington, which amounted to about $4,000. 
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Fourth, although Exhibit A identifies only Wasatch Steel and 
All Star Manufacturing as the parties to whom Heaton sold steel, 
Elkington learned, later, that Heaton was also selling steel to 
Mr. Trailer and Davis Supply. [R452 at 147.] 
As the foregoing reflects, Wasatch Steel's statement that 
Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement was accurate is simply and 
demonstrably wrong. Each of the four misrepresentations and 
omissions in Exhibit A are uncontested. There was ample basis 
for rescission. 
II. LIMITATIONS POSES NO BAR 
As the statement of facts above reflects, Wasatch Steel and 
Hurst perpetrated an integrated fraud upon Steelco. Wasatch 
Steel and Hurst bribed Steelcofs employees and conspired with 
Heaton to systematically steal from Steelco its remnant material. 
An essential ingredient of that fraudulent scheme, as the trial 
court found, was concealment of these outrageous arrangements 
from Steelco, a concealment in which Wasatch Steel and Hurst 
actively participated. Defendants now incredibly argue that 
Steelco1 s claims should be barred because they were so successful 
in concealing from Steelco the fraud that was being perpetrated 
upon it. 
Steelco sought recovery for the same losses based upon five 
theories -- conversion, fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and 
receiving stolen property. The court found separately the 
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damages recoverable by Steelco for the stolen steel and the 
kickback transactions under the conversion, fraud, and conspiracy 
theories. The damages recoverable under the racketeering and 
receiving stolen property statutes have already been found by the 
trial court, although recovery was denied upon legal grounds that 
Steelco challenges below. Thus, even if Wasatch Steel is suc-
cessful in persuading the Court that the limitations period has 
expired with respect to part of Steelcofs conversion claim, 
Steelco is nevertheless entitled to recover for the same loss 
under its fraud, conspiracy and remaining claims, with respect to 
which there is unquestionably no limitations defense. 
A. The Limitations Issue was not Properly Raised Below. 
Although defendants in their Amended Answer pleaded the limita-
tions periods prescribed in Section 78-12-25 and -26 [R89], 
defendants1 arguments to the court addressed only limitations 
with respect to the conversion claim. [R405.] As indicated 
above at pages 27-28, even if a defense is raised in a party's 
pleading, unless the matter is presented to the court for deci-
sion in argument to enable the court to address the subject, the 
defense is not properly presented on appeal. Accordingly, by not 
properly raising them below, all limitations arguments other than 
those that may relate to the conversion claim should not be 
considered on appeal. 
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B. As to all of Steelco*s Claims, Limitations Runs From 
Discovery. The limitations period for fraud is three years and 
Mthe cause of action in such case does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud. . . ." Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3). Steelco agrees with 
defendants that !![i]n an action based on civil conspiracy, the 
applicable statute of limitations is determined by the nature of 
the action in which the conspiracy is alleged.11 [Wasatch Steel 
Brief at 35.] As the statement of facts makes clear, the nature 
of the action in which this conspiracy occurred is clearly one of 
fraud. Thus, Steelcofs conspiracy claim is governed by the same 
limitations period as the fraud limitations period, which runs 
upon discovery. The limitations period with respect to the tort 
of conversion is three years as set forth in Section 78-12-26(2). 
That limitations period is the only one before the Court that is 
not made by statute expressly to run from discovery. Under the 
circumstances presented here, as the trial court found, the 
discovery rule should apply to all theories. [R351.] 
The Supreme Court has firmly embraced the doctrine that the 
limitations period may begin to run when a party discovers the 
facts giving rise to his claim. E.g., Christiansen v. Rees, 436 
P.2d 435 (Utah 1968). In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 
1981), the Supreme Court held that the discovery rule is based on 
a balancing test and is applied when f,[t]he hardship the statute 
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of limitations would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances 
of that case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from 
difficulties of proof caused by damage caused by the passage of 
time." Id., at 87. In the Myers case, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that because (i) defendant could not establish prejudice 
by having to defend a stale claim since ffhis problems of proof 
occasioned by the delay are no greater than the plaintiffsf" and 
(ii) "plaintiffs could not file an action for damages or even 
initiate investigative efforts to determine the cause of a 
[claim] of which they had no knowledge." Ld. at 87. Similarly, 
in Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990), the Court 
applied the discovery rule to a case of surveyor negligence, 
reasoning that, on balance, the prejudice to the claimant in 
having its claim barred outweighed the prejudice to the surveyoi 
in that the surveyor could still testify although his crew's 
memories had dimmed and their survey notes were no longer avail-
able. See also Maughan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying Utah law) and Merkley v. Beaslin, 
778 P.2d 16 (Utah App. 1989) (discovery rule applied in legal 
malpractice case). The trial court found all of the facts 
determined in Klinger and Myers to mandate application of the 
discovery rule here. 
The trial court specifically found that the discovery rule 
should be applied in this case. [R351.] The trial court based 
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that finding upon its determination that the hardship that any 
limitations would otherwise impose upon Steelco outweighs any 
prejudice to Wasatch Steel and Hurst from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time. The court specifically found that 
Wasatch Steel and Hurst could not establish any prejudice from 
having to defend a stale claim since the proof in this case was 
more accessible to them than to Steelco, the proof in substantial 
part was derived from defendants1 own records and testimony, and 
defendants affirmatively concealed the facts from Steelco over an 
extended period of time. The court further found that Steelco 
could not file any action or even initiate investigative efforts 
to determine the existence of its causes of action since prior to 
discovery Steelco had no knowledge of its claims or any reason to 
suspect any claims existed. 
Defendants' argument that the discovery rule should not 
apply in this case appears at pages 42-43 of their brief. There, 
defendants do not challenge the court's factual findings, other 
than inferentially, but instead advance unsupported and con-
elusory statements that are contrary to the court's findings. 
When an appellant assails the sufficiency of evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings of fact, it has the burden of marshal-
ing all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and then demonstrating that the findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. E.g. , 
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Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). When an 
appellant fails to carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, 
the appellate courts have refused to consider the merits of 
challenges to findings and have accepted the findings as valid. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's findings are, however, amply supported by 
the evidence. The dates of delivery and amounts of stolen steel 
that was fraudulently acquired or converted by defendants were 
proved by defendants' own records. [Exhibits 1-P, 2-P, 3-P, 4-P, 
5-P, and 6-P.] The only party who dealt on behalf of defendants 
with the transactions giving rise to these claims was Hurst, who 
was Wasatch Steel's general manager and controlling personality. 
Defendants therefore were not prejudiced in their defense by any 
lack of evidence. It is uncontested that Steelco had no knowl-
edge of its claims or any reason to suspect that such claims 
existed until November of 1987 (with respect to the stolen steel) 
and October of 1988 (with respect to the kickbacks). Clearly, 
Steelco could not have filed any action until it discovered its 
claims. The extensive evidence supporting the court's finding 
that defendants fraudulently concealed their unlawful activities 
is set forth below at pages 49-52. 
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Defendants disingenuously suggest that there are no "excep-
tional circumstances'1 that warrant application of the discovery 
rule here. If a party, through fraud and conspiracy, can avoid 
liability for the damages caused by its activities by success-
fully misleading and deceiving the injured party and by conceal-
ing its fraud, then Steelco respectfully submits that there can 
be no circumstance sufficiently exceptional to mandate the 
application of the discovery rule. The Supreme Court has applied 
the discovery rule in far less exceptional circumstances. 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978) (defendant 
misled plaintiff regarding leaky pipe); Merkley, supra (legal 
malpractice); Klinger, supra (surveyor negligence). 
In summary, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, each 
fact necessary to the application of the discovery rule in this 
case. Defendants have not challenged, properly or at all, those 
findings by the court. In any event, the court's findings are 
amply supported by the evidence. 
C. Steelco did not Discover Either the Steel Thefts or the 
Kickbacks Within the Limitations Period. In paragraph 46 of its 
Findings of Fact, the court found that Steelco did not know and 
could not with reasonable diligence have learned of the facts 
giving rise to its claims against defendants arising from the 
stolen steel until at least November of 1987 and from the payment 
of kickbacks to Heaton and Williams until October of 1988. 
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[R350-51.] Defendants attack this finding at: pages 40-41 of 
their brief. As indicated above, the appellant has the burden of 
marshaling all of the evidence in support of the court's decision 
and, if the appellant fails to do so, this Court need not consider 
those challenges and shall presume the court's findings to be 
supported by the evidence. In this section of defendants1 brief, 
only one citation to the record appears, and it is misleading. 
Here is what defendants offer as the only record-supported 
evidence that plaintiffs exercised no diligence: 
. . . Steelco left its Superintendent in a 
position where he could do "almost . . . what 
he wanted'1 with the scrap material that 
plaintiff is now suddenly concerned about. 
[R.450 at 184.] 
Here is an exact quotation of the record, which is the testimony 
of Heaton's supervisor, Leon Hansen: 
Q. He could almost do what he wanted over 
there, couldn't he? 
A. That is correct, yes. 
Further down on the same page, Mr. Hansen testified that as to 
scrap, Heaton could have acquired 100 pounds of scrap, so long as 
it was for his own use. [R450 at 184.] Neither Leon Hansen nor 
any other Steelco employee testified that Heaton could do what-
ever he wanted with the scrap. On the contrary, all Steelco 
employees, including Heaton, testified that employees could 
purchase material only for their own use and were required to 
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follow usual paperwork procedures in their purchases. The 
remaining factual assertions contained at pages 40-41 (which 
include no citation to the record) are contrary to the record. 
The trial court's findings as to the discovery and discov-
erability of Steelcofs claims are amply supported by the record. 
Steelco!s policy allowed its employees to purchase material for 
themselves at cost for their own use and required that such 
employee sales had to be documented in the ordinary course. 
[R450 at 126-27.] Heaton, from time to time, purchased material 
and followed those procedures. [R450 at 128-29; Exhibit 16-P.] 
When a Steelco supervisor on one occasion noticed that Heaton had 
failed properly to follow the paperwork procedures, he was issued 
a written warning. [Exhibit 18-P.] Heaton never spoke with his 
supervisors about purchasing materials and reselling those mate-
rials. [R450 at 137.] When Heatonfs supervisor learned that 
Heaton was improperly removing material from Steelco, he was 
immediately fired. [R450 at 137.] When Steelcofs employees were 
aware that material was being loaded for Heaton, Heaton created 
phony paperwork that indicated he had purchased the material from 
Steelco. That paperwork was thereafter destroyed by Heaton. 
[R450 at 203-04.] Heaton generally loaded the steel himself from 
the shop after Steelcofs business hours, which concluded at 3:30. 
The shop, however, did not close at 3:30 -- there was a second 
shift in the processing and loading department, which was not 
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supervised by anyone other than Heaton. Heaton!s supervisor, 
Leon Hansen, was not located in the shop area where Heaton loaded 
the steel -- he was located a block away. On those few occasions 
when Steelco personnel saw Heaton loading steel into his truck, 
he told them he was buying the steel. [R451 at 100-05.] When 
Steelcofs trucks (rather than Heatonfs truck) were involved in 
delivering steel to Wasatch Steel, Heaton arranged, with Hurst, 
to pay Steelco for a fraction of the total payment, which led 
Steelco to believe that it was being paid for all of the steel. 
[R451 at 113-15.] 
Discovering Heaton1s thefts was all the more difficult to 
discover because he did not steal uncut new material; rather, he 
stole the remnant material. The pieces of steel that remained 
after new stock pieces were cut to size could be either remnant 
or scrap. Scrap went into scrap tubs and was sold to scrap 
dealers and remnant went into remnant racks and was to be used in 
Steelcofs own operation. [R450 at 118.] Obviously, keeping 
track of whether remnant material was disappearing was virtually 
an impossible undertaking. 
The amount of steel stolen by Heaton, although large in 
absolute terms, was a minuscule percentage of the steel that 
passed through Steelcofs facility during the same period. Heaton 
stole steel over a four calendar year period and received in the 
aggregate from Hurst just over $38,000 for the stolen steel. 
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[Exhibit 27-P.] Heaton was paid on the order of 8c per pound for 
the stolen steel. [Exhibit 6-P.] Thus, Heaton stole on the 
order of 475,000 pounds of steel over a four year period. On the 
other hand, 10-12 million pounds of steel is purchased and dealt 
with by Steelco each year [R452 at 41] -- on the order of 48 
million pounds in four years. The steel stolen by Heaton was 
therefore less than one percent of the steel dealt with by 
Steelco during the same period. 
Upon the first suggestion to Steelco!s management of im-
propriety, management immediately commenced a thorough inves-
tigation which ultimately resulted in the discovery of Heaton1s 
thefts. [R452 at 124-33.] 
With respect to the kickback transactions, Heaton never 
inquired whether it would be permissible for him to receive a 
kickback for arranging steel purchases from his supervisor. 
[R450 at 141.] Heaton's supervisor was not aware that Heaton was 
receiving kickbacks from Wasatch Steel. [R450 at 141.] Chris 
Williams worked for Alene Lamoreaux, Steelco1s purchasing agent. 
Ms. Lamoreaux was not aware that Heaton and Chris Williams were 
receiving kickbacks on Steelco1s purchases from Wasatch Steel. 
[R452 at 54, 75.] The first occasion upon which Steelco!s 
management learned of any kickbacks being paid to anyone was in 
October, 1988, when Chris Williams voluntarily came forward and 
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told Bob Elkington of the practice. [R451 at 158; R452 at 
141-46.] 
In summary, the trial court's finding that Steelco did not 
know and could not with reasonable diligence have learned of the 
facts giving rise to its claims with respect to the stolen steel 
until at least November of 1987 and with respect to the kickback 
transactions until October of 1988 is amply support by the 
record. Steelco had every reason to act upon any indication that 
its steel was being stolen or that its employees were accepting 
bribes . There is no evidence that Steelco received any such 
indication prior to the dates found by the trial court. Also 
contributing to the inability of Steelcofs management earlier to 
discover these activities is the affirmative concealment prac-
ticed by defendants, which is detailed in the section that 
follows. 
D. Defendants Concealed from Steelco its Cause of Action. 
The trial court found that the limitations period was tolled 
because Wasatch Steel and Hurst fraudulently concealed from 
Steelco its claims. [Finding of Fact 148; R352.] In that 
finding, the trial court identified various respects in which 
defendants acted to conceal their unlawful activities from 
Steelco. Those findings are all supported by the record. 
One obviously sufficient circumstance of fraudulent conceal-
ment was the very fact of defendants1 entering into a conspiracy 
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with Heaton and Chris Williams, as the court found, to engage in 
these unlawful activities and to keep them secret from plain-
tiffs. [Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 42, 43; R339 at 349-50. ] In 
addition, any act done by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the 
common plan is the act of all, and each actor is responsible for 
such act. E.g., Vaughan v. Hornaman, 195 Kan. 291, 403 P.2d 948 
(1965). See, Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah 
App. 1987), cert, dismissed, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). The 
Supreme Court has also recognized that the concealing acts of 
defendants1 privies or insurance adjuster can toll the limita-
tions period. Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 163 
(Utah 1969). Since Wasatch Steel and Hurst conspired with 
Williams and Heaton and since Williams and Heaton are defendants1 
privies for this purpose, the concealment acts of Heaton and 
Williams are attributed to Wasatch Steel and Hurst. Further, 
Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on their own, committed acts of conceal-
ment . 
The steel was stolen after Steelcofs regular business hours, 
when the entire Steelco plant other than the separate fabrication 
plant that Heaton supervised was closed. [R451 at 1, 103-04.] 
On the extremely limited occasions upon which Heaton was seen 
loading material by Steelcofs management, Heaton assured them 
that he was purchasing the material. [R451 at 103.] When 
Steelco personnel were involved in the loading or delivery of the 
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steel, Heaton created phony paperwork to suggest that the steel 
was being legitimately purchased and thereafter destroyed it. 
[R450 at 203-04.] Hurst and Heaton agreed that their dealings 
would be kept secret and that Heaton would not tell Steelcofs 
management what was going on. [R451 at 7-8.] Hurst conducted 
his dealings with Heaton in such a manner as to prevent Steelcofs 
management from learning of those arrangements. [R450 at 68-70; 
R454 at 143-44.] All of Hurst's meetings with Heaton at 
Steelco!s premises were clandestine -- Hurst's conduct led 
Steelcofs personnel to believe that Hurst was only a social 
acquaintance. [R450 at 68-70; R452 at 25-26, 79-80.] On those 
occasions when Steelcofs trucks were involved in deliveries to 
Wasatch Steel, Hurst and Wasatch Steel arranged to cut checks to 
Steelco for a small portion of the material and to Heaton for the 
other portion, misleading Steelco to believe that it was being 
paid for all of the steel that its trucks and employees removed 
from Steelcofs premises. [R451 at 4-5.] With respect to the 
kickback transactions, Heaton always told Hurst that Steelco was 
not to know about these arrangements and Hurst agreed to keep the 
arrangement secret. [R451 at 23-24, 31-32.] Hurst never spoke 
to Steelco's management about the kickbacks that he paid to 
Heaton and Chris Williams, even though, by his own testimony, at 
the time he paid the kickbacks, he thought it was a !fsleazyM 
practice and that he would have immediately fired one of his own 
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employees if they had received a kickback under the same circum-
stances. Although the foregoing is plainly sufficient, addi-
tional evidence of fraudulent concealment is discussed below at 
pages 57-61. 
III. THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED 
A. The Trial Court Properly Entered its Findings Which are 
Entitled to a Presumption of Propriety. At pages 44-47 of their 
brief, defendants suggest that counsel, and not the court, found 
the facts in this case, that the court was unilaterally hostile 
towards defendants, and that the trial judge abandoned his duties 
as a judge to find for plaintiffs. Defendants are wrong as a 
matter of law and as a matter of fact, 
1. Standard of Review. Rule 52(a) provides in part 
that ''findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses." A finding is clearly erroneous only if this Court 
concludes that the finding is against the great weight of evi-
dence. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). The review-
ing court accords the trial court substantial deference to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Wright, 744 
P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987). 
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2. The Trial Court Showed no Hostility to Defendants. 
A review of the record cited in defendants1 brief will make 
crystal clear that defendants are misleading this Court as to 
their claim of hostility. Prior to the court's statement to Mr. 
Garrett that "well, I have made my judgment, Mr. Garrett,1' which 
defendants suggest constitutes hostility, Mr. Garrett stated to 
the court: 
Perhaps, Your Honor would not care to hear 
this, but I was astonished that Your Honor 
would accept the testimony of Chris Williams. 
It was totally unbelievable in my judgment. 
[R455 at 13; Defendants' Brief at 46, n.6.] 
Defendants complain that the trial court expressed concern that, 
after Lynn Hurst testified under oath in his deposition that all 
of his cash records had been stolen, he nevertheless was able to 
locate the same cash records to offer into evidence. [R454 at 
127-28; Defendants1 Brief at 46, n.6.] Defendants' claim of 
trial court hostility is devoid of support. 
3. The Trial Court Made its Findings Based Upon Clear 
and Convincing Evidence. In its Memorandum Decision, the court 
stated that it found by a "preponderance of the evidence" the 
facts. The findings ultimately entered by the court were based 
upon clear and convincing evidence. Defendants claim some error 
in this procedure. Prior to the court's entry of its findings, 
the court held a hearing to address that and related issues. At 
that hearing, the court stated as follows: 
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In this particular case, as I just sat 
in there and dictated, I did in fact, as I 
reviewed my Memorandum Decision, it is true 
it stated that I was finding from a prepon-
derance of the evidence. It is amazing 
because I usually never say one way or 
another and I don't know why those words 
rolled up. But there is no question in my 
mind that I made my findings based upon clear 
and convincing evidence, and therefore the 
words I used in that regard, in regards to 
certain of those findings, really that 
memorandum must be amended because that was 
not what I intended and my findings were 
based upon clear and convincing evidence. 
[R455 at 2.] 
Thereafter, the court entered the findings, based upon clear and 
convincing evidence. Defendants1 request that this Court find 
error in the standard applied by the trial court requires that 
the trial court be disbelieved. 
4. The Court Made its own Findings. At pages 44-47 
of their brief, defendants inaccurately suggest that the trial 
court mechanically adopted findings submitted by plaintiffs' 
counsel. The Supreme Court addressed the entry of findings in 
Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). In that case, 
plaintiffs on appeal asserted that the trial court erred in 
"adopting the findings of fact as prepared by the defendant 
without any modification or change." JA. at 1113. The Supreme 
Court stated: 
The court may ask counsel to submit findings 
to aid the court in making the necessary 
findings for the particular case. While we 
do not recommend that the trial judge "me-
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chanically adopt11 the findings as prepared by 
the prevailing party, we certainly do not 
find such to be the fact in this case. After 
the proposed fffindingsM were submitted by 
defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed ob-
jections and proposed amendments which were 
argued before the trial court who ultimately 
adopted the findings as submitted. The 
discretion of adopting the findings as 
submitted to the trial court is exclusively 
in that court as long as the findings are not 
clearly contrary to the evidence. We find no 
error in this regard. Id. at 1113-14. 
The trial court in this case did far more in preparing findings 
than did the trial court in the Boyer case. After trial, the 
court entered an unusually detailed nine page Memorandum Decision 
containing 27 numbered findings. [R273.] In those findings, the 
court found each material element to the defendants1 liability 
under three theories and rejected liability under two theories. 
At paragraph 27, the court stated that its decision was not 
intended to include all necessary findings and directed plain-
tiffs1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions, and a judgment 
and "in doing so will add those additional facts, established by 
the evidence, that are supportive of this Memorandum Decision." 
Plaintiffs1 counsel then submitted proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the court. Defendants then filed 
39 pages of objections to those findings, which in the main 
consisted of their disagreement with the court's decision. 
[R283.] The court later held a hearing at which the parties 
argued their respective positions on the findings and con-
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elusions. [R455.] The court thereafter entered an order reject-
ing defendants1 objections and amending its Memorandum Decision 
to state that the court had made its findings by clear and 
convincing evidence. [R376.] 
Judge Russon did not mechanically adopt anything. The 
findings were his own. 
B. Defendants Have Improperly Challenged the Court's 
Findings. As indicated above in section II.A., when an appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate courts have refused 
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and have 
accepted them as valid. Defendants1 challenge to the courtfs 
findings generally presents only testimony that was disbelieved 
by the trial court, that tends not to support the trial court's 
findings, and that lacks citations to the record. Defendants' 
clear failure to marshal the evidence should result in this 
Court's refusal to consider defendants' challenge. 
Defendants' challenge to the trial court's findings requires 
that the trial court believe Lynn Hurst and disbelieve virtually 
every other witness in one respect or another. Mr. Hurst, who 
repeatedly bribed Steelcofs employees, who lied in his deposition 
saying that all of his cash records had been stolen to avoid 
producing them for Steelco's inspection, who testified at trial 
to the opposite of what he testified to in his deposition, again 
and again, and who, while under oath at trial, testified that he 
approves of the practice of paying kickbacks, is a person that, 
we submit, should not be believed. The trial court obviously did 
not believe him. 
C. The Court's Findings are Supported. At pages 48-61 of 
their brief, defendants challenge four of the court's findings, 
each of which is addressed in turn below. 
1. Defendants Knew of the Fraud and Conspiracy. Both 
the court's Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact that 
were ultimately entered specifically found that defendants knew 
of the fraud that was being perpetrated upon Steelco. At pages 
48-50, defendants challenge that finding. 
Defendants suggest at pages 49-50 that two quotations 
from Heaton1s testimony establish that Heaton and Hurst never 
discussed the fact that the steel was stolen. In the first 
quotation, which is indented, Heaton indicated only that when he 
first started dealing with Hurst, Heaton indicated that he was 
buying and reselling the steel to him. Defendants1 statement 
that Heaton again affirmed that the subject was never brought up 
again is inaccurate. 
The statement of facts above sets forth the evidence 
establishing that defendants had knowledge of the fraud being 
perpetrated upon Steelco. That evidence included evidence that 
Heaton repeatedly reminded Hurst that his deliveries of stolen 
steel were to be kept secret and Hurst agreed to secrecy. It is 
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implausible to believe that Hurst thought his dealings with 
Heaton were aboveboard when Heaton went to great lengths to keep 
their dealings private, when Hurst misled Steelco employees to 
believe that Hurst was a personal friend, and when Hurst never 
dealt with anyone at Steelco other than Heaton. 
The purchase and delivery process were suspicious in 
the extreme. Virtually all deliveries were after Steelcofs 
hours. Hurst picked out the remnants he wanted from Steelcofs 
remnant racks and paid only a fraction of their value for them. 
A person in the steel business would know that the remnant was 
used by Steelco and was not for sale. Wasatch Steel paid both 
Steelco and Heaton for exactly the same kinds of materials in the 
amounts directed by Heaton even though all of the steel came from 
Steelco. There is no rational explanation why Steelco would sell 
part and Heaton would sell part of a series of loads -- Hurst!s 
splitting the payments between Steelco and Heaton on loads 
involving Steelco personnel was an obvious effort to mislead 
Steelco into believing that it was being paid for its steel. 
Defendants1 position on appeal is premised almost 
exclusively upon their claimed reliance upon Heaton as an all 
powerful supervisor of Steelco1s shop. Defendants claim that 
they were convinced of Heatonfs bona fides and of his authority 
to be paid for huge amounts of steel removed from his employer!s 
premises over an extended period of time is beyond comprehension, 
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when Hurst was concurrently bribing Heaton to defraud his em-
ployer. Hurst's own admission that, at the time he paid the 
kickbacks, he thought it was a "sleazy practice" and that 
Heaton1s request for the commission caused his view of Heaton1s 
integrity and honesty to drop is of crucial significance. Hurst 
himself testified that he was paying Heaton a kickback to cause 
Steelco to purchase "rough material" -- junk. Nevertheless, 
Hurst did not advise Steelco of this fact, Hurst never inquired 
about Heaton1s authority to be paid, individually, for huge 
amounts of steel removed over an extended period from Steelcofs 
premises, and Hurst materially participated in the concealment of 
the fraud. 
When Steelco first discovered Heatonfs thefts and 
approached Hurst for assistance in determining their extent, 
Hurst did not react like an honest businessman. He insisted on 
speaking to his attorney first and then, before talking to 
Elkington, he and Heaton got their stories straight. Heaton told 
Elkington that he delivered less than $10,000 worth of scrap to 
Hurst and Hurst confirmed that phony number. Hurst withheld 
records from Elkington and the only records Elkington saw were 
those handpicked by Hurst, which had to be pried out of Hurst 
year by year. Although Hurst knew that Elkington was investigat-
ing the nature and extent of Heatonfs improper activities, and 
Hurst admitted that it would have been important for Elkington to 
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know about the kickbacks, Hurst never told Elkington about the 
kickbacks. [R454 at 157.] 
It is doubtful that many defendants candidly admit 
their knowledge and participation in fraudulent activities. All 
of the evidence other than Mr. Hurst's version of things, however, 
convincingly points to Hurst and Wasatch Steel's knowledge of and 
affirmative participation in a scheme to defraud Steelco through 
purchasing its stolen steel at bargain prices and inflating the 
prices paid by Steelco for materials sold by Wasatch Steel 
through the kickback scheme. 
2. There was a Conspiratorial Agreement. At pages 
51-52, defendants, again without marshaling the evidence, argue 
that the evidence does not support the existence of a conspiracy 
agreement, which the court found in both its Memorandum Decision 
and its Findings. As the Court stated in Israel Pagan Estate v. 
Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah App. 1987), "it is not necessary 
in a civil conspiracy action to prove that the parties actually 
came together and entered into a formal agreement to do the acts 
complained of by direct evidence. Instead, conspiracy may be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the nature of 
the act done, the relations of the parties, and the interests of 
the alleged conspirators.ff With respect to kickbacks, the 
arrangement was clear and express: Both Volma Heaton and Chris 
Williams testified that Hurst would quote a price which 
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would then be inflated by agreement depending upon how much of a 
kickback was to be paid. The parties1 agreement that Wasatch 
Steel would accept stolen steel and pay a low price for it can be 
inferred from their having done so for years, from their obvious 
efforts to keep the arrangement secret, from their cooperative 
efforts to conceal the thefts and resales from Steelcofs manage-
ment, from Hurst's knowledge of the fact that the steel was 
stolen, from Hurst's lying to Elkington about the unavailability 
of part of his records, and from Hurst's and Heaton's agreement 
to confirm to Elkington a phony, reduced amount of steel that was 
purchased by Wasatch Steel. 
3. Heaton had no Actual or Apparent Authority to 
Steal. At pages 52-56, defendants argue that Heaton was clothed 
by Steelco with actual or apparent authority to act as he did. 
Both the court's Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact 
found that Heaton had no actual or apparent authority to sell 
remnant steel to Wasatch Steel. Since the court found that Hurst 
and Wasatch Steel knew that Heaton was stealing from Steelco the 
material that he was reselling to Wasatch Steel, it is self-
evident that the defendants did not rely upon any "apparent 
authority" of Heaton in their dealings with him. It is mystify-
ing how defendants can ask this Court to believe that they relied 
upon the bona fides of a man to whom they were regularly paying 
bribes. 
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The doctrine of apparent authority is not even applica-
ble here. If Steelco led Hurst to believe that Heaton was 
authorized to sell the steel, then Hurst should have been writing 
checks to Steelco and the doctrine of apparent agency might 
vaguely apply to this case. Agency is not an issue in this 
case -- Hurst does not even claim he was dealing with Steelco. 
Even if the doctrine of apparent authority had applica-
tion here, it requires that the principal lead third parties to 
believe that the agent has authority to bind the principal. Bank 
of Salt Lake v. The Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). The 
court found that Steelco did nothing to mislead defendants about 
Heaton1s authority. Implied authority, about which defendants 
also speak, merely affords an agent implied authority to do the 
natural and ordinary incidents of what is expressly authorized. 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah 1978). Here, it is uncon-
tested that Heaton was not expressly authorized to sell steel to 
third parties or, more obviously, to steal steel from his em-
ployer. 
This section of defendants1 brief is a self-serving, 
misleading, and inaccurate recitation of facts and events. Many, 
if not most, of defendants1 statements have no record support or 
citation. Defendants, who admit bribing a Steelco employee to 
defraud his employer, assert that "Defendants1 dealings with 
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Steelco were entirely consistent with normal business practices. 
There is nothing unusual or improper in Mr. Hurst's dealing with 
plaintiffs1 Superintendent. . . ." Another example is defen-
dants1 statement that others made purchases from Heaton "without 
suspecting any lack of authority." Although others surely 
purchased from Heaton, the remainder of the statement is devoid 
of record support. 
The court's finding that Steelco did nothing to clothe 
Heaton with authority to deal as he did with defendants is 
supported by the record. At pages 7-12 of the statement of facts 
of this brief are set forth some of the evidence supporting that 
finding. 
4. Defendants1 Characterization of the Kickbacks is 
Inaccurate. At pages 56-57, defendants distort and misrepresent 
the record on the subject of the kickbacks. An accurate descrip-
tion of the kickback transactions is found at pages 14-21 of the 
statement of facts section of this brief. The trial court found 
that Hurst paid Volma Heaton eight kickbacks totaling in excess 
of $4,000 and, in addition, paid Chris Williams multiple kick-
backs in an amount aggregating $5,700. Defendants1 statement 
that there were only four kickbacks is inaccurate. Defendants 
state that Elkington did not see records disclosing the kickbacks 
when he asked Wasatch Steel for this information because he did 
not ask to review the check register. That is not true and the 
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record does not support that statement. Even though Elkington 
asked Hurst about the unlawful activities of Heaton, Hurst did 
not disclose that he had been paying bribes to Heaton, one as 
recently as two months prior to Elkingtonfs visit. 
Defendants argue that the ffballastM steel, upon which 
some of the kickbacks were paid, needed no special appearance, 
served its intended purpose, was competitively priced, and that 
as a result Steelco suffered no loss. The court's findings, and 
the evidence, are that the junk that Hurst peddled using his 
bribery scheme did not fulfill the requirements for ballast, 
required huge amounts of extra labor to prepare it for its 
intended use, and that over 30,000 pounds of the stuff is still 
sitting in SteelcoTs yard, unused and unusable. 
Wasatch Steel's self-serving recitation in this portion 
of its brief leaves the reader with the impression that Mr. Hurst 
is on the verge of sainthood. As has been demonstrated, the 
testimony of Mr. Hurst, alone, is sufficient to establish his 
commission of the crime of bribery. 
5. Hurst Paid Chris Williams Kickbacks. In both its 
Memorandum Decision and Findings, the court found that Hurst paid 
Chris Williams multiple kickbacks. Again, defendants have made 
no effort to marshal the evidence, as they must, but instead have 
advanced a self-serving, incomplete, and inaccurate recitation of 
the evidence. 
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As Chris Williams candidly admitted during her testi-
mony, she was a drug user during her employment in Steelco1s 
purchasing department and stole money to support her habit. 
Steelco fired her in June of 1986 for stealing cash. In October 
of 1987, she checked herself into Highland Ridge Hospital for 
five weeks and, except for one use of drugs on November 27, 1988, 
Chris has not used alcohol or drugs at any time since. [R451 at 
155-57.] She is presently an active member of Alcoholics Anony-
mous. [R451 at 157.] Two years after she was fired, Chris 
voluntarily returned to Steelco and advised Elkington of all of 
her unlawful activities, of which Steelco was previously unaware. 
Very significantly, at the time she so informed Steelco, Steelco 
was ignorant of any kickbacks being paid to anyone. Heaton had 
not informed Steelco of his kickback arrangement. Williams 
advised Elkington that Heaton had told her of his kickback 
arrangements with Hurst which in turn prompted Williams to engage 
in the same activity. It is absolutely inconsistent that Williams 
would fabricate her receipt of kickbacks when (i) she had no 
motive to do so and (ii) she was the first person to advise 
Steelco of the kickback arrangements, which have since been fully 
corroborated by both Mr. Hurst and Mr. Heaton. 
All of Heaton, Williams, and Midgley testified that 
Hurst knew and dealt with Chris Williams. Hurst testified that 
he had never seen her prior to her deposition in this case. 
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Defendants suggest that there is nothing in Wasatch 
Steelfs records to show any kickbacks to Chris Williams. That is 
not surprising, for three reasons. First, Chris Williams tes-
tified that Hurst paid her kickbacks in cash; Heaton's kickbacks 
were paid with checks, thereby leaving a record. Second, Wasatch 
Steelfs cash records were first completely stolen and then 
selectively reappeared. Hurst testified in his deposition that 
"all11 of his cash records relating to the period during which 
Williams received her kickbacks were stolen, although at trial he 
conveniently located a few "stolen11 records to serve his own 
evidentiary purposes. The date of the alleged theft was very 
shortly after Elkington began his investigation into Wasatch 
Steel's activities. Hurstfs bookkeeper, from whom he testified 
the records were stolen, was not called as a witness at trial. 
The absence of Wasatch Steel's cash records concerning kickbacks 
paid to Williams is not at all surprising. Third, whereas Heaton 
was paid kickbacks by Wasatch Steel checks, in the case of Chris 
Williams, the cash kickback amount was split between Williams and 
Hurst. After agreeing with Hurst on an amount by which the usual 
price of the goods would be jacked up, Hurst and Williams would 
split the difference. [R451 at 152-53.] Hurst, himself, re-
ceived approximately 20% of the difference in cash. [R451 at 
187-91.] Hurst may not have wanted to keep a record of his 
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activities since he, himself, may have been defrauding Wasatch 
Steel by personally receiving these cash payments. 
Defendants correctly indicate that, shortly before 
trial, Ms. Williams destroyed her diary, which contained a record 
of the kickbacks that were paid to her. Williams prepared 
another document summarizing the inappropriate financial dealings 
while at Steelco which were contained in her diary. [R451 at 
146-47.] Chris Williams testified that she threw away her 
personal diary because "that is in my past now. I didn't want to 
bring that up. I don't need to look at that anymore. I threw my 
diaries away.11 [R451 at 160-61.] The lost diary is understand-
able and of no significance. 
As they did in their statement of facts, defendants at 
page 58 of their brief attempt to discredit Chris Williams' 
testimony by attempting to show mathematical disparities in the 
kickback transactions. As indicated in the statement of facts 
above, however, these disparities exist only if Chris Williams 
was paid the exact amounts on the three exact transactions 
identified by defendants, and no others. Chris Williams did not 
so testify. She was sure only of the total amount received in 
kickbacks -- she was understandably unsure of the exact trans-
actions on which she was paid, the exact amounts involved in any 
transaction, the exact period of time during which the kickbacks 
were paid, or the exact number of kickbacks that she was paid. 
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Chris Williams1 testimony needs no corroboration, but 
even if it did, it is corroborated by Hurst and Heatonfs testi-
mony that Hurst was regularly paying bribes to Steelco's employ-
ees, a fact that Chris Williams was the first to disclose to 
Steelco. It is also corroborated by Lynn Hurst's offering false 
testimony during his deposition that all of the cash records that 
may have evidenced these commissions were stolen. It is also 
corroborated by the fact that although each of Chris Williams, 
Heaton, and Patty Midgley testified that Hurst knew and dealt 
with Chris Williams, Hurst denied ever having seen her prior to 
her deposition. If Hurst is lying about having never seen Chris 
Williams, he is just as surely lying about not having paid bribes 
to her, just as he did regularly with Heaton. 
6. The Court's Findings on Conversion are Supported. 
At pages 60-61 of their brief, defendants suggest that (i) Heaton 
was entitled to receive some of the steel that he sold and (ii) 
Heaton!s apparent authority precludes conversion. With respect 
to the first point, the trial court clearly delineated the 
materials that were given to Heaton from those that Heaton stole, 
and plaintiffs were not awarded damages with respect to the 
materials that were Heaton?s to sell. The court's findings and 
the evidence supporting those findings is set forth at pages 
12-1U of the statement of facts above. On the authority issue, 
it has already been demonstrated that Heaton had no such author-
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ity, and, in any event, defendants knew that the steel was 
stolen. Even if they did not, however, under established Utah 
law, even a party innocently purchasing from a thief is liable in 
conversion. 
The intent required for conversion is not any wrongful 
intent; rather, the defendant need only intend to exercise a 
dominion or control over the goods -- that is, if Wasatch Steel 
intended to take possession of and resell the goods, the intent 
element is fulfilled. That fact is uncontested. 
A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer 
who sells them in the utmost good faith 
becomes a converter, since his acts are an 
interference with the control of the prop-
erty. W. Prosser, Law of Torts at 83 (4th 
Ed. 1971). 
In Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726 (Utah 1958), the Supreme Court 
addressed conversion in the context of a party's receipt of 
stolen property. There, seed growers delivered seed to one 
Malin, who without their authority sold the seed to Union Seed 
Company. The growers sued the seed company for conversion. The 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Although conversion results only from inten-
tional conduct it does not require a con-
scious wrongdoing, but only an intent to 
exercise dominion or control over the goods 
inconsistent with the owner's right., A 
purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer 
who sells them in good faith becomes a 
converter since his acts are an interference 
with the control of the property or in other 
words, a claiming of the ownership in such 
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property and taking it out of the possession 
of someone else with intentions of exercising 
dominion over it is a conversion. Thus, a 
bona fide purchaser of goods for value from 
one who has no right to sell them becomes a 
converter when he takes possession of such 
goods. Ld. at 728. 
The Allred case is indistinguishable from this case -- even 
assuming that Steelco entrusted portions of the steel to Heaton's 
care and that by virtue of his position at Steelco Heaton had 
apparent authority to sell the steel, he nonetheless lacked 
actual authority and, accordingly, Wasatch Steel's purchases 
amounted to a conversion, regardless of defendants1 good faith. 
Just this year, the Supreme Court affirmed its Allred holding in 
Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 
1991). 
Defendants1 argument necessarily rests upon the propo-
sition that a good faith purchaser should not be liable for 
conversion. The courts have unanimously held that a purchaser's 
good faith or knowledge is irrelevant to a cause of action for 
conversion. Matter of 1969 Chevrolet, 656 P.2d 646 (Ariz. App. 
1982); Moore v. Regents of University of California, 249 Cal. 
Rptr. 494 (Cal. App. 1988); Klam v. Koppel, 118 P.2d 729 (Idaho 
1941); Nelson v. Hy-Grade Constr. & Materials, Inc., 527 P.2d 
1059 (Kan. 1974); Bader v. Cerri, 609 P.2d 314 (Nev. 1980); 
Jeddkins v. Sadler-MacNeil, 376 P.2d 837 (Wash. 1962); Seay v. 
Vialpando, 567 P.2d 285 (Wyo. 1977). The two cases cited by 
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defendants are inapposite. They concern a partner's authority to 
bind a partnership and whether a corporation's general manager 
had authority to bind the corporation. Here, it is undisputed 
that Volma Heaton did not have authority to steal and resell his 
employer f s products. 
IV. THE MEASURE AND CALCULATION OF 
DAMAGES WAS APPROPRIATE 
A. The Amount of Damages Awarded was Correct. At pages 
61-63, defendants argue that the court applied a retail value 
measure of damages for the conversion claim, which was inappro-
priate. As defendants concede, the court awarded to Steelco the 
amount that Wasatch Steel received on resale for the goods that 
were stolen from Steelco. The Utah Supreme Court has on multiple 
occasions indicated that the measure of damages for a conversion 
is the "value" of the property at or near the time of conversion. 
Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 
P.2d 418 (Utah 1961). "Value" or "market value" is the retail, 
not the wholesale value of the goods. In Henderson v. For-Shor 
Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988), the Court stated as follows: 
The measure of damages for conversion when 
property is not returned is the value of the 
property at the time of the conversion, plus 
interest. * * * Market value is defined as 
the price for which the property is bought 
and sold at retail in the marketplace or, in 
the case of unique property, the value to the 
owner. Id. at 468. 
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The Henderson Court relied in part upon the case of Winters v. 
Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978), in which the 
Supreme Court stated that the measure of value for the loss of 
personal property is the price for which the article is bought 
and sold in the marketplace, "and the legal definition of that 
price is retail, not wholesale." Id. at 454. Defendants argue 
that, although retail is the proper measure in a consumer 
context, wholesale is the proper measure when the plaintiff is a 
dealer in the goods converted. In Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 
726 (Utah 1958), the farmers were allowed to recover the differ-
ence between the price paid by the purchaser, Union Seed Company, 
and the price they actually received from Malin -- thus, the 
damage award was based on sales price, not the cost of replace-
ment. Similarly, in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418 (Utah 1961), 
the Court held that the appropriate measure of damages is the 
"market value" of the forms converted, not the replacement cost. 
Id. at 421-22. 
Here, the "market value" adopted by the court was, as 
defendants admit, based upon Hurst's own testimony as to that 
"value" -- the amount that he could resell the goods for. 
Whether that measure is "market value," for which Hurst sold the 
goods, or "retail value" is irrelevant. The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §927 comment i (1977) provides: 
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If the converter has disposed of the chattel, 
the owner, in addition to his other rights, 
can elect to recover the value of the chattel 
at the time of the disposition, from the 
seller. . . . 
Illustration 11 of this section is as follows: 
A, bailee at will for B, wrongfully sells to 
C for $1,000 bailed commodities then worth 
$1,200. Knowing the facts, C sells them for 
$1,300 to D. . . . When B discovers the 
facts, the commodities have a value of $800. 
B is entitled to recover $1,200 from A, or 
$1,300 from C. . . . Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §927 illustration 11 (1977) . 
This illustration is directly on point. A would be Heaton, B 
would be Steelco, and C would be Wasatch Steel. Applying that 
illustration, Wasatch Steel should be required to disgorge the 
amount it received from the sale of the converted property. In 
Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985), 
the defendant, like appellants here, relied upon Section 911 of 
the Restatement as authorit3/ that the wholesale price, not the 
sale price, is the proper measure of damages. The Court rejected 
this argument, reasoning that ff[t]he profit margin is part of the 
value as inventory, even though, like the rest of the price, it 
is not realized until sale." Id. at 606-07. Wasatch Steel by 
resale established market value, and under all authorities, 
Steelco is entitled to recover that market value. 
Even if this Court were to reject the measure of damages 
applied by the trial court for conversion, the lower court, with 
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respect to fraud and conspiracy, found the value of the very same 
materials based upon the amount that Steelco was required to pay 
to replace the material. [Finding of Fact t60; R358; R452 at 
168-71.] Thus, even if the Court adopts defendantsf view of the 
measure of damages, the trial court has already found the amount 
of Steelcofs damages based upon the measure of damages advocated 
by defendants, and no retrial is necessary. 
B. The Court's Damage Findings Were Correct. At pages 
63-66 of their brief, defendants pursue their standard practice 
of ignoring all of the evidence supporting the court's findings, 
inaccurately stating the evidence favorable to themselves, and 
failing to advance record support for the statements lacking such 
support. As the statement of facts above reveals, Wasatch Steel 
purchased only remnant, not scrap, from Heaton. As Hurst, 
himself, testified, Wasatch Steel resold what it purchased from 
Heaton for double what was paid to Heaton. The remnant steel 
that was stolen was in the main taken from remnant racks, where 
it was placed to be reused, as new steel, in Steelcofs fabrica-
tion operation. The remnant material was worth as much to 
Steelco as new steel -- the pieces were just smaller. The 
uncontested facts are that Heaton stole remnant material from 
Steelco and that the remnant material had the same value to 
Steelco as new steel. The court so found, and the record sup-
ports that finding. The court awarded to plaintiffs under their 
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conversion theory the amount that, according to Hurst, Wasatch 
Steel sold the material for. Under Steelco's fraud and conspir-
acy theories, the court awarded to Steelco the value of the goods 
stolen to Steelco -- based upon the amount that Steelco would be 
required to pay to purchase the very same goods. There is 
neither mystery nor distortion in the trial court's finding as 
suggested by defendants. 
C. The Court's Award of Attorney's Fees was Appropriate. 
At pages 66-67 of their brief, defendants argue that there was no 
legal basis for the award of attorney's fees here. Whenever 
exemplary damages are awardable, attorney's fees are properly 
awardable. DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capitol Int'1 Airways, 583 
P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1978). As will be demonstrated in the 
section that follows, exemplary damages are appropriate, and so 
also is an award of attorney's fees. 
D. Punitive Damages are Appropriate Here. In Atkin Wright 
& Miles v. The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709 
P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court stated the standard for 
recovery of punitive damages: "[P]laintiff must prove conduct 
that is willful and malicious . . . or that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of 
others." Id. at 337; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 164 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991). In two Utah cases, the Court in a 
conversion context has sustained punitive damage awards when the 
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defendant's conduct was knowing. Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1975); First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
We are not here dealing with a jury gone wild. Judge 
Russon, a respected judge, heard all of the evidence and himself 
made detailed findings in his Memorandum Decision which included 
findings that defendants' actions "were willful and made with 
reckless disregard to the rights of others, and punitive damages 
are, therefore, appropriate. Punitive damages are for the 
purpose of punishment, and a deterrent and warning to defendant 
and others that such behavior will not be tolerated by society.tf 
[R278.] As has been amply demonstrated above, defendants1 
conduct, including conspiring to defraud Steelco of vast quan-
tities of stolen steel and payment of multiple bribes to multiple 
employees of Steelco, amply support an award of punitive damages 
in this case. By Hurst's own testimony, he knew what he was 
doing was wrong and a sleazy, dishonest practice. Hurst con-
tinued to pay kickbacks and receive stolen steel at bargain 
prices, however, because he could not have cared less about 
Steelcofs legitimate rights -- he was too busy making money from 
his sleazy dealings with Steelcofs dishonest employees. What we 
have here is a company which obviously did not care about what 
was right of wrong -- Wasatch Steel and Hurst cared only about 
what they could get away with. But for the existence of the 
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Wasatch Steels and Lynn Hursts of the world, people with drug 
problems would have difficulty selling their stolen goods, and 
dishonest employees would have difficulty defrauding and stealing 
from their employers. Hurst and Wasatch Steel, through their 
indifference towards the law and the rights of Steelco, allowed 
this pervasive fraud to go on for in excess of four years --
until a recovering drug abuser who decided to make a clean break 
of it told the truth. But for Steelco's independent discovery of 
Heaton's thefts and Chris Williams' commendable conduct of coming 
forward with the truth, Hurst and Wasatch Steel would undoubtedly 
still be paying kickbacks to Steelco's employees and purchasing 
steel stolen from Steelco's premises. Exemplary damages are 
required here. 
In fixing the amount of punitive damages, the finder of fact 
must consider (i) the nature of defendant's acts, (ii) the 
probability of those facts being repeated in the future, and 
(iii) the relative wealth of defendant. Terry v. Zions Coopera-
tive Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). The trial court 
considered each of those factors in arriving at its exemplary 
damage award of $100,000. [R353 152.] 
A punitive damage award will be affirmed unless it appears 
that the award "has resulted from passion or prejudice rather 
than reason and justice." First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feed-
yards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1982). Here, the nature of 
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defendants' acts is reprehensible. The probability of those acts 
being repeated in the future is unquestionably good, since 
Wasatch Steel's business is conducive of receiving stolen prop-
erty and Lynn Hurst has told the court that he sees nothing wrong 
with kickbacks. The relative wealth of defendants is the remain-
ing consideration. 
Wasatch Steel's relative wealth is demonstrated through 
Exhibits 49-P and 50-P. Those financial records, which were 
prepared by Wasatch Steel specifically for trial, no doubt 
understate or at least conservatively state the wealth of Wasatch 
Steel. Even so, Exhibit 49-P reflects a net worth of Wasatch 
Steel in the amount of $461,087.07. That substantial figure 
would, according to Hurst's own testimony, be increased by at 
least a good part of the accumulated depreciation amount of 
$145,331.55 shown on page 1 since he testified that the value of 
the company's assets was as shown on the balance sheet without 
regard to depreciation. [R454 at 24-26.] In addition, that net 
worth figure includes a downward adjustment of an unexplained 
"prior period adjustment" in the amount of $63,281.98 shown on 
the second page. With respect to Exhibit 50-P, Hurst admitted 
that Wasatch Steel makes about $9,000 per month in clear profit, 
and that is even after the owners are furnished with their 
multiple fringe benefits. Even at a conservative $9,000 per 
month profit figure, Hurst testified that the business might be 
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worth a million dollars. [R454 at 32-33.] Hurst owned 15Z of 
Wasatch Steel. 
Thus, the hundred thousand dollar punitive damage award can 
be viewed as eleventh months of Wasatch Steel's profits or 
one-tenth of Wasatch Steelfs net worth. Steelco's actual damages, 
exclusive of interest, are more than three-quarters of the 
punitive damage award amount. If interest is considered, actual 
damages exceed the punitive damage award. 
The court has recently sustained multiple punitive damage 
awards in the range of this one, where punitive damages range 
from one-half to twice the amount of actual damages. Synergetics 
v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); First Security Bank v. 
J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 592 (Utah 1982). The exemplary 
damage award by the court in this case is well within the guide-
lines established by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1991). There, the Court held that where the punitive damage 
award is less than $100,000, an award is not excessive Mwhen 
punitives do not exceed actual damages by more than a ratio of 
approximately three to one." Id. at 13. 
In this case, multiple factors justify the exemplary damage 
award and its amount. First, the award was created by a thought-
ful judge, not an impassioned jury. Second, defendants1 conduct 
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was particularly reprehensible. Defendants' knowing, intentional, 
fraudulent behavior systematically occurred over an extended 
period of time and involved conduct rising to the level of 
criminal activity -- knowing receipt of stolen property and 
bribery. Third, as the record in this case amply demonstrates, 
Wasatch Steel's controlling personality, Lynn Hurst, is a 
palpable liar who testified at trial that he had no problem with 
kickbacks. Fourth, the amount of the punitive damage award is 
reasonable in relation both to the actual damages sustained by 
Steelco and the wealth of defendants. The award is appropriate 
and should be sustained. 
CROSS APPEAL 
V. STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER 
THE RACKETEERING ACT 
The trial court found that Steelco did not prove its claims 
under the Racketeering Enterprises Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§76-10-1601, elt seq. (the "Act") because Wasatch Steel and Hurst 
engaged only in three or more episodes of unlawful activity 
involving only one victim, Steelco -- the trial court held that 
the Act requires proof of episodes of unlawful activity involving 
three separate victims. [R279 at 25; R359 at 62.] The trial 
court found all other elements of defendants1 liability under the 
Act. 
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Section 76-10-1605 of the Act provides for a private remedy 
as follows: 
(1) A person injured in his person, 
business, or property by a person engaged in 
conduct forbidden by any provision of Section 
76-10-1603 may sue in appropriate district 
court and recover twice the damages he 
sustains, regardless of whether: a) the 
injury is separate or distinct frc the 
injury suffered as a result of the acts or 
conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful 
conduct alleged as part of the cause of 
action; or (b) the conduct has been adjudged 
criminal by any court of the state or of the 
United States. 
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of 
action brought under this section recovers 
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorneyfs fee. 
* * * 
(4) In all actions under this section, 
a principal is liable for actual damages for 
harm caused by an agent acting within the 
scope of either his employment or apparent 
authority, A principal is liable for double 
damages only if the pattern of unlawful 
activity alleged and proven as part of the 
cause of action was authorized, solicited, 
requested, commanded, undertaken, performed, 
or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
directors or a high managerial agent acting 
within the scope of his employment. 
Thus, the predicate for liability under the Act is a violation of 
Section 76-10-1603, which in turn provides as follows: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who 
has received any proceeds derived, whether 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of 
unlawful activity in which the person has 
participated as a principal, to use or 
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invest, directly or indirectly, any part of 
that income, or the proceeds of the income, 
or the proceeds derived from the investment 
or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or 
operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person 
through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise 
to conduct or participate, whether directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of that enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to 
conspire to violate a provision of Subsec-
tions (1), (2) or (3). 
Section 1603, then, requires that the defendant engage in a 
"pattern of unlawful activity." That phrase is defined in 
Section 76-10-1602(2) as follows: 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" 
means engaging in conduct which constitutes 
the commission of at least three episodes of 
unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics. Taken together, the episodes shall 
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and 
be related either to each other or to the 
enterprise. At least one of the episodes 
comprising a pattern of unlawful activity 
shall have occurred after July 31, 1981. The 
most recent act constituting part of a 
pattern of unlawful activity as defined by 
this part shall have occurred within five 
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years of the commission of the next preceding 
act alleged as part of the pattern. 
That section, in turn, is predicated upon the commission of 
episodes of "unlawful activity,11 which is defined in turn in 
Section 76-10-1602(4) : 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to 
directly engage in conduct or to solicit, 
request, command, encourage, or intentionally 
aid another person to engage in conduct which 
would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes, or 
to attempt or conspire to engage in an act 
which would constitute any of those offenses, 
regardless of whether the act is in fact 
charged or indicted by any authority or is 
classified as a misdemeanor or felony: * * * 
(k) theft, Section 76-6-404; * * * (n) 
receiving stolen property, Section 76-6-408; 
* * * (s) bribery or receiving bribe by 
person in the business of selection, ap-
praisal, or criticism of goods, Section 
76-6-508. 
The trial court found each required element to defendants1 
liability under the Act: 
1. Injury to plaintiff's business or property 
[Section 76-10-1605]. See Findings of Fact 1116, 17, 
30, 41, 45 [R335, et seq.1. 
2. Use of proceeds of unlawful activity in the 
establishment or operation of a business or participate 
in a business!s affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity (pattern of unlawful activity being described 
below under paragraph 3) [Section 76-10-1603]. See 
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Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 32, 33, 34, 35 [R335, et 
seq.]. 
3. Participation in at least three episodes of 
similar or related conduct for financial gain involving 
a. Theft [Section 76-6-404]. See Findings 
of Fact 1114, 15, 20, 26 [R335, et seq.]. 
or b. Receiving stolen property [Section 
76-6-408]. See Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 26 
[R335, e_t seq. ] . 
or c. Bribery [Section 76-6-508]. See Find-
ings of Fact 1131, 32, 33, 34 [R335, et seq.]. 
or d. Aiding or soliciting any of the fore-
going. [Section 76-10-1602(4)]. See Findings of 
Fact 1114, 42 [R335, et seq.]. 
or e. Conspiring to commit any of the fore-
going [Section 76-10-1602(4)]. See Findings of 
Fact 1114, 42 [R335, et seq.]. 
4. One episode must occur after July 31, 1981 
and another within five years of the next preceding 
episode [Section 76-10-1602(2)]. See Finding of Fact 
110, Exhibit 27-P, Finding of Fact 132 [R335, et seq.]. 
Thus, the trial court found each and every element required 
to subject defendants to liability under the Act. The trial 
court erred in construing Section 76-10-1602(2) to require three 
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separate episodes of unlawful activity involving separate vic-
tims . There is no basis in the language of that section to infer 
such a requirement; indeed, the section suggests the opposite 
interpretation. Section 76-10-1602(2) requires that the episodes 
"have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission. . . . Taken together, the 
episodes shall . . . be related either to each other or to the 
enterprise." In this case, as the court found, Hurst, Williams, 
and Heaton ("similar participants") systematically engaged in 
multiple briberies and thefts ("similar methods of commission and 
results") involving Steelco (the "same victim") -- a classic 
racketeering offense. 
Since the trial court found each element to defendants1 
liability under the Act, Steelco is entitled to judgment against 
defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $211,480.66 
as shown on Exhibit 32-P, interest on the doubled principal 
amount thereof, and Steelco1s attorney's fees, which the court 
found to be $35,850. Exhibit 32-P is merely a summary of the 
losses suffered by Steelco as a result of the thefts of its steel 
and kickbacks (the dollar amounts of which were specifically 
found by the trial court as paragraphs 17, 30, and 41 of its 
Findings of Fact), which doubles the damage amounts as prescribed 
by the Act. Steelco is entitled to the substitution of its 
greater recoverable damages under the Act for the damage amounts 
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awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment relating to the 
stolen steel and kickbacks. Under the Act, Steelco is plainly 
entitled to recover its attorney's fees [Section 76-10-1605(2)], 
and the limitations period under the Act unquestionably has not 
run [Section 76-10-1605(9)]. 
VI. STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
UNDER THE RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY"STATUTE 
The trial court found that Steelco did not prove its claims 
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(2) (the "Statute") because Wasatch 
Steel was not in a business of the sort contemplated by Section 
76-6-408(2)(d), which is incorporated in the Statute. [Finding 
of Fact 1(63; R359.] The trial court found all elements to 
defendants' liability under the Statute, but erred in its legal 
interpretation of Section 76-6-408(2)(d). 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(2) provides: 
(2) Any person who has been injured by 
a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) may 
bring an action against any person mentioned 
in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d) for three times 
the amount of actual damages, if any sus-
tained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Section 76-6-408(1) generally provides that a person commits 
theft if he receives or disposes of property knowing that it is 
stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen. The trial 
court found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel received multiple loads 
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of steel from Heaton knowing that it had been stolen and that 
Steelco was injured as a result. [Findings of Fact KU3, 41; 
R338.] This element is satisfied. 
The Statute only renders liable a "person mentioned in 
Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d)." The entirety of Section 76-6-408 is 
quoted below: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably 
has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or 
aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for para-
graph (1) is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of 
other property stolen on a separate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property 
within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort 
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a 
consideration which he knows is far below its 
reasonable value. 
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or 
operates a business dealing in or collecting used 
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or 
an agent, employee or representative of the 
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person 
delivering the property to certify, in writing, 
that he has the legal rights to sell the property. 
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If the value given for the property, exceeds $20 
the pawnbroker or person shall also require the 
seller or person delivering the property to obtain 
a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at 
the bottom of the certificate next to his signa-
ture and at least one other positive form of 
identification. 
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has 
or operates a business dealing in or collect-
ing used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, and every agent, employee or 
representative of the pawnbroker or person 
who fails to comply with the requirements of 
(d) shall be presumed to have bought, re-
ceived or obtained the property knowing it to 
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. 
This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(ii) When in a prosecution under this 
section it appears from the evidence that the 
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who 
has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, or was an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, 
that the defendant bought, received, con-
cealed or withheld the property without 
requiring the person from whom he bought, 
received, or obtained the property to sign 
the certificate required in paragraph (d) and 
in the event the transaction involves an 
amount exceeding $20 also place his legible 
print, preferably the right thumb, on the 
certificate, then the burden shall be upon 
the defendant to show that the property 
bought, received or obtained was not stolen. 
Thus, apart from the trial court's finding that defendants knew 
the steel was stolen, the Statute provides that Wasatch Steel is 
presumed to have known or believed that the property was stolen 
or probably stolen if (a) it was in possession of property stolen 
on a separate occasion, as the court found in Finding No. 10 
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[76-6-408(2)(a)] or (b) it received stolen property within the 
year preceding the transaction in question, as the court found in 
Finding No. 10 [76-6-408(2)(b)] or (c) it acquired the material 
for consideration known to be far below its value, as the court 
found in Finding No. 14 [76-6-408(2)(c)] or (d), being in the 
used steel business, it received property from Volma Heaton and 
failed to require that he in writing certify as to his ownership 
of the property, as Mr. Hurst himself testified was the case 
[R450 at 68] [76-6-408(2)(d)]. 
The trial court, although finding each element to defen-
dants1 liability under the Statute, dismissed this claim on the 
ground that M[n]either Wasatch Steel Inc. nor Hurst is fa pawn-
broker or person who has or operates a business dealing in used 
or collecting used or second-hand merchandise or personal prop-
erty, or an agent, employee or representative of the pawnbroker 
or person who buys, receives or obtains property1 within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2)(d)." [Finding No. 63; 
R359]. The quoted language expressly includes pawnbrokers OR a 
person who deals in used or second-hand property. The trial 
court found, and the evidence was undisputed on this point, that 
nWasatch Steel Inc. is in the business of purchasing and selling 
both new and used steel.11 [Finding No. 3; R335] . In this case 
itself, Wasatch Steel received on the order of 100 loads of used 
steel from Heaton. Wasatch Steel and Hurst are, according to the 
-89-
court's findings, parties within the statutory definition of 
persons liable under the Statute. 
Steelco is therefore entitled to judgment under the Statute 
against Hurst and Wasatch Steel, jointly and severally, in the 
amount of $271,051.93 shown on Exhibit 33-P, interest on the 
trebled principal amount thereof, and Steelcofs attorney's fees, 
which the court found to be $35,850. Exhibit 33-P is merely a 
summary of the losses suffered by Steelco as a result of the 
thefts of its steel (the dollar amounts of which were specif-
ically found by the trial court at paragraphs 17 and 30 of its 
Findings of Fact) which triples the damage amounts as prescribed 
by the Statute. These amounts should be substituted for the 
amount awarded under paragraph 1 of the Judgment relating to 
stolen steel. The Statute clearly allows Steelco to recover its 
attorney's fees [§76-6-412(2)], and there has been no limitations 
defense pleaded or argued with respect to Steelco's claims under 
the Statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Steelco seeks the following relief in this appeal and cross 
appeal: 
First, Steelco requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's Judgment in all respects other than its dismissal of 
Steelco's claims under the Racketeering Enterprises Act and 
receiving stolen property statute. 
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Second, Steelco requests that this Court award it judgment 
under the receiving stolen property statute in the trebled amount 
of $271,051.93, and interest, which amount should be substituted 
for the corresponding amount awarded by the trial court for the 
stolen steel loss in paragraph 1 of the Judgment. 
Third, Steelco requests that this Court award it judgment 
under the Racketeering Enterprises Act in the doubled amount of 
$211,480.66, which amount should be substituted for the corre-
sponding amounts awarded by the trial court for both stolen steel 
and kickback transactions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment. 
If this Court grants relief under the receiving stolen property 
statute, the larger trebled amount thereof noted under the 
preceding paragraph ($271,051.93) should be added to double the 
amount of Steelco1s kickback damages ($31,958.30 -- see Finding 
No. 61 for undoubled amount) to arrive at the amount of 
$303,010.23, which should be substituted for paragraphs 1 and 2 
of the court's Judgment. 
Fourth, Steelco requests that this case be remanded to the 
district court for a determination of the attorney's fees in-
curred on appeal by Steelco, the amount of which should be added 
to the attorney's fees awarded through trial by the trial court. 
Fifth, Steelco requests an award of its costs on appeal. 
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